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NGOs play a significant role in advancing development in Kenya. Over the years there 
has been significant growth in the NGO sector. While this is good, trouble begins where 
there are no adequate accountability measures in place to regulate the sector. The rift 
between the growth in the NGO sector and the accountability mechanisms has led to an 
increase in demands for accountability in the sector. This thesis is meant to determine the 
status of NGO accountability within the country and begins by considering the current 
state of affairs. It analyses the existing legal and regulatory frameworks on accountability 
and proceeds to examine their impact in order to determine the adequacy of the provisions. 
Research was conducted with reliance on the stakeholder theory which advocate for the 
inclusion of all relevant parties and due consideration of the interests of all parties in all 
governance structures. It was revealed through the extensive research done that there are 
a number of inadequacies in the law in relation to accountability. The inadequacies revolve 
around the lack of clarity as to the what, why and who of accountability measures. It also 
explores the extent to which key accountability mechanisms such as self-
regulation, participation and social auditing are incorporated into existing 
structures. Upon establishing the inadequacies, a comparison with South Africa follows 
to determine whether the South African NGO sector has in place a proper accountability 
framework to guide the operations of NGOs. In conclusion, the research outlines the 
shortcomings identified providing viable recommendations to curb each problem in 
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This chapter lays the foundation of the thesis by briefly discussing corporate governance 
and delving into accountability as a key aspect of corporate governance with specific focus 
on Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The research outline is laid out in this 
chapter starting with a definition of NGOs to demonstrate the scope of coverage and 
moving on to the statement of the problem, the hypothesis and on to the research questions. 
Literature from various authors on NGO accountability and other related areas will be 
evaluated and summarized for purposes of identifying key areas of interest. The literature 
reviewed is also meant to demonstrate the areas covered by previous research in order to 
establish existing gaps that this thesis is meant to address. Research methods relied on 
shall be discussed in this chapter. The limitations encountered during research shall also 
be presented for purposes of demonstrating their implications on the research.  
1.1. Background of the Study 
Corporate governance has in the recent times become a vital component for the success 
of any organisation. The global economy and business environment have experienced a 
number of scandals and corporate failures which have exacerbated the need for 
organisations in both developed and developing countries to embrace corporate 
governance.1 Much of the attention has been directed towards the profit sector, even 
though the non-profit sector has also had its share of failures in efforts to foster 
accountability. In Republic v Cabinet Secretary Ministry of Interior & Co-ordination of 
National Government & 6 others Ex-parte Africa Centre for Open Governance & 7 
others 2 the court granted an order of certiorari quashing the decision by the Non-
Governmental Organisations Coordination Board (NGOCB) to close down operations by 
Africa Centre for Open Governance (AfriCOG) based on the manner in which the action 
was undertaken. This is just one out of the suits filed and whose judgements are indicative 
                                                          
1 Sonmez M and Yildirim S, ‘A theoretical aspect on corporate governance and its fundamental problems: 
Is it a cure or another problem in the financial markets?’ 3(1 and 2), Journal of Business Law and Ethics, 
2015, 21.  
2 (2017) eKLR. 
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of the failures of NGOCB accountability efforts. There is need therefore, to widen the 
scope of corporate governance to cater for this sector.  
There is no consensus on the meaning of corporate governance incorporated in the 
numerous writings on the subject.3 The foregoing notwithstanding, corporate governance 
is widely defined as the arrangement by which corporations are directed and controlled.4 
With respect to NGOs, it is defined as a set of principles and practices adopted by the 
governing body, in sectors both private and social-welfare oriented, to assure stakeholders 
of effective and appropriate management of the entity.5 It is therefore concerned with 
creating a balance between commercial vis-a-vis societal goals and between individual 
vis-à-vis shared goals. In doing this, corporate governance encourages efficient resource 
management, accountability in the use of power, stewardship and possible alignment of 
the interests of parties concerned and in society at large.6 In comparing the general 
definitions, one notes that corporate governance generally creates a balance in the 
different relationships existing amongst the various players in an organisation including 
directors, managers, shareholders, financiers amongst others.  
Corporate governance espouses a number of pillars and principles and centre to it is the 
principle of accountability and this research will deal with the principle of accountability 
in relation to NGOs. The concept of accountability has widespread use and just like 
corporate governance, there is no agreement concerning its definition. Most of the 
definitions reviewed concentrate on the interaction amongst a number of actors, where a 
part of the actors provide description of their activities and others receive and evaluate 
                                                          
3 Sonmez M and Yildirim S, ‘A theoretical aspect on corporate governance and its fundamental problems’, 
23.   
4 Cadbury, A, ‘Report of the committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance’-< 
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf> 1992. 
5 The Government of Hong Kong, Special administration region report.  
6 Private sector initiative for corporate governance, Nairobi; Principles for corporate governance in Kenya 
and a sample code of best practice for corporate governance.-< https://www.ics.ke/wp-
content/uploads/bsk-pdf-manager/Principles_of_good_corporate_Governance_Private_Sector_-
_CS_Gabriel_Kimani_110.pdf>  Nairobi, Kenya : Private Sector Corporate Governance Trust, 1999. 
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those activities. Emphasis is placed on the accountability of individuals through systems 
which reduce the conflict of competing interests amongst these actors.7 
An argument can be advanced to the effect that corporate governance relates to companies 
as it takes a stakeholder oriented approach. However, it is notable that in the recent past, 
corporate governance has continued to adopt a stakeholder oriented approach and it 
mandates management to consider the interests of stakeholders and the organisation as a 
whole. A stakeholder has been defined by Edward Freeman as a party likely to be 
impacted by an organisation’s actions8 or whose actions are likely to affect the attainment 
of the objectives of the organization.9 NGOs operate across the country in various sectors 
therefore affecting the interest of many people. There are levels of stakeholders and this 
will be explored in detail in chapter three and four of this research.  
To trace the historical background of NGOs, one has to understand charity and 
philanthropy. Charity and philanthropy entailed giving to others in need by those with 
accumulated resources, to advance the idea of sharing in order to help, protect and 
preserve the community.10 The government failure theory has been used to explain the 
existence of non-profit organisations. The theory argues that the government suffers 
limitations in relation to the goods and services that it is required to provide to the citizens 
and non-profit organisations step in to fill the niches left unserved by the government. 
Most of the non-profit organization’s activities are therefore prominent in minority areas 
where citizen populations are most diverse.11 
There has been a tremendous increase in the number of organizations participating in the 
development sector over time. Globally, the statistics remain inconclusive.12 In Kenya, 
the growth is evidenced in the number, geographical distribution and scope of NGOs. In 
                                                          
7 Khan H, ‘A Literature review of corporate governance’ International Conference on E-business, 
Management and Economics (IPEDR) Vol 25, http://www.ipedr.com/vol25/1-ICEME2011-A10015.pdf , 
2011, 1. 
8 Murray V, ‘Governance of non-profit organisations’ West View Press, Colorado, 2001, 10.  
9 Freeman R, Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Boston, MA: Pitman, 1984, 46. 
10 Block S, ‘Board of directors’ West View Press, Colorado, 2001, 15.  
11 Froelich K, ‘Diversification of revenue strategies; Evolving resource dependence in non-profit 
organisations’, West View Press, Colorado, 2001, 190.  
12 Werekoh K, ‘Accountability systems of non-governmental organisations (NGOs): Case study from 
Ghana’ Unpublished LLM thesis, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, 2014, 1. 
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1993, there were 250 registered NGOs in Kenya; this number grew to 1441 NGOs in 
200013, 9728 NGOs in 201414 and 11,262 in 2019.15 Currently, over 11,000 NGOs are 
operating in all counties and in different sectors of the economy.16 The steady growth 
points to a growing interest in the third sector17 in Kenya. 
The growth has led to increased governance and regulatory problems for players in that 
space including regulators and donors.18 In Africa, these problems have been responded 
to in two ways. The first is evidenced by governments progressively proposing tougher 
consolidated regulatory rules for NGOs, but with inadequate capability for execution. The 
second is where NGOs try out schemes of private self-regulation. Self-regulation is a term 
used to refer to NGO efforts to regulate themselves and further refers to efforts of groups 
of NGOs to set and enforce standards for all participants within the group.19 The 
overriding objective of these regulations is to ensure that measures be established for 
checks, balances and accountability by NGOs.  
Over the years, the NGOCB has de-registered, suspended or threatened to deregister 
NGOs in Kenya. Such actions are as a result of violations of the provisions of the NGO 
Coordination Act (NGO Act) and its regulations, or violations of the terms and conditions 
of registration.20 In 2014, NGOCB deregistered 510 NGOs on grounds of suspicion of 
raising funds for terrorism, engaging in criminal activities and failing to provide financial 
audit returns.21 During the same period, the development sector in Kenya received more 
                                                          
13 Kameri - Mbote P, ‘The operational environment and constraints for NGOs in Kenya: Strategies for good 
policy and practice’ International Environment Law Research Centre, Working Paper Number 2, 2014 –
http://www.ielrc.org/content/w002.pdf on 8 December 2016. 
14 Non-Governmental Organizations Co-ordination Board, NGO sector report, 2013/2014. 
15 Non-Governmental Organizations Co-ordination Board, The annual NGO sector report, 2018/2019, 20. 
16 Non-Governmental Organisation Board, Annual report and financial statement, VII, 30 June 2016.   
17 Makoba W, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOS) and third world development: An alternative 
approach to development, Journal of Third World Studies -< 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/177/31620.html >  2002,   
18 Gugerty K, ‘Models of NGO self-regulation: Theory and evidence from Africa’ University of 
Washington, Working Paper Number 4, 2007–
https://evans.uw.edu/sites/default/files/public/EvansWorkingPaper-2007-04.pdf on 27 January 2019. 
19 The International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, Handbook on good practices for laws relating to NGOs, 
The World Bank discussion draft, May 1997.  
20 The annual NGO sector report, 2018/2019, 21. 
21 Agence France-Presse, ‘Kenya closes down hundreds of NGOs’ Aljazeera, 16 December 2014– 
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/12/kenya-closes-down-hundreds-ngos-
20141216124722577348.html> on 16 December 2014. 
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than Kshs. 120 billion to fund humanitarian projects, with more than Kshs. 6 billion of 
that amount coming from undisclosed sources.22 In 2015, the NGOCB threatened to 
deregister 959 NGOs for failure to account for their funding from donors, operating 
multiple bank accounts and engaging in money laundering. The NGOs at risk of 
deregistration at the time failed to account for more than Kshs. 25 billion.23 
In the Kenya Human Rights Commission v Non-Governmental Organizations Co-
ordination Board (2016) eKLR issues pertaining to fair administrative action and 
constitutionality of the provisions of the NGO Act were raised. Following the cancellation 
of its certificate of registration, the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) filed a 
petition against the NGOCB arguing that the actions by NGOCB violated its right to fair 
administrative action and to fair hearing as stipulated in Article 47 and 50 of the 
Constitution of Kenya respectively. KHRC therefore sought from the court a declaration 
that the NGOCB’s actions were unconstitutional. It was held that, while the respondent 
indeed acted in compliance with the provisions of the NGO Act, the provisions did not 
conform to the constitutional provisions. A declaration was therefore issued rendering the 
actions by the NGOCB unconstitutional, null and void.  
From this analysis, one also notes that there are incidences of non-accountability by NGOs 
as well as an impulsive regulator.  
1.2. Problem Statement 
The legislative and regulatory framework on NGOs in Kenya has proven inadequate in 
ensuring accountability of NGOs to their stakeholders leading to a rise in cases of non-
accountability of NGOs. 
The NGOs Act approach is largely of self -regulation to be achieved through openness to 
learning and change and periodic appraising and evaluating of conduct on the part of the 
                                                          
22 Standard Digital, ‘List of Kenyan NGOs that risk deregistration’ -
<https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000181037/list-of-kenyan-ngos-that-risk-de-registration  7May 
2019 >,on 29 October, 2015 
23 The New Humanitarian News, ‘NGOs in Kenya protest threatened deregistration of 959 organizations’ 
The Humanitarian, 30 October 2015–<http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2015/10/30/ngos-
kenya-protest-threatened-deregistration-959-organisations>on 30 October 2015. 
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NGOs. The NGO Act further establishes regulatory institutions such as the NGOCB, 
which is mandated to hold NGOs accountable. Despite the existence of the above legal 
provisions and regulatory institutions, the public has continued to witness cases of 
misappropriation of funds by NGOs amongst other ills which point to inadequacy of the 
legal and regulatory framework.   
1.3. Hypothesis 
a. H1: Increased cases of non-accountability by NGOs in Kenya indicate that there are 
inadequacies in the Kenya’s legal and regulatory framework in relation to NGO 
accountability. 
b. H2: Reforms in the legislative framework to bring about a system of accountability 
that is inclusive of all stakeholders in the NGO sector in Kenya and provides for their 
active involvement will enhance accountability practices by Kenyan NGOs. 
1.4. Research Objectives  
a. Analyse the approach taken by the Kenya’s legal and regulatory framework in relation 
to NGO accountability. 
b. Analyse how the specific inadequacies in the legal and regulatory framework for 
regulation of NGOs in Kenya contribute to deficits in NGO accountability to 
stakeholders. 
c. Analyse the specific reforms on accountability that are required to be included in the 
existing NGO legal and regulatory framework in order to foster good governance. 
1.5. Research Questions 
a. What approach to NGO accountability does Kenya’s legal and regulatory framework 
take?  
b. What specific inadequacies in the legal framework for regulation of NGOs in Kenya 
contribute to deficits in NGO accountability to stakeholders? 
c. What specific reforms in the existing NGO legislation framework are required to 




1.6. Literature review 
Good corporate governance allows for enhancement of business integrity and creation of 
market confidence. This is crucial for future–oriented organisations in need of funding for 
their sustenance. The NGO sector all over the world has enjoyed a period of relative 
disinterest with minimal focus on it. However, in the recent past there has been increased 
scrutiny and criticism to the sector with the illumination of scandals.24 At the international 
level, there are media reports that 255,000 British Pounds is the mean salary for a chief 
executive officer of the top 100 charities with the highest paid earning about 850,000 
British Pounds a year 25 and in view of this, financiers begin to question the use of the 
resources donated to NGOs. Such reports have contributed to the increased calls for NGOs 
to be accountable.  
Jordan contends that demands are being made on NGOs to respond to queries concerning 
their level of independence and reliability of their structures, legitimacy and 
effectiveness.26 The independence and reliability questions are asked as a result of the 
rapid growth of the sector which necessitates the need to strengthen the NGO structures 
on governance, financial management practices and policies amongst others. Legitimacy 
questions are based on the need to demonstrate public transparency, compliance to 
mission, relationship with the communities served and the value to the society as a whole. 
Effectiveness questions relate to the quality of the services delivered by NGOs and 
responsiveness to the needs of their beneficiaries. 
Brown, Moore and Honan recommend that when NGOs evaluate their accountability to 
different stakeholders they should ask whether accountability is undertaken on moral, 
legal or prudential grounds.27 Moral grounds encompass analysing whether NGOs are 
accountable in terms of moral values held by the society or organisational values. The 
                                                          
24 OTT J, Understanding Non Profit Organisations: Accountability concepts and controversies, Westview 
Press, USA, 2001, 352.  
25 Morley D, ‘NGO scandal: making poverty profitable’ International Marxist Tendency,  
https://www.marxist.com/ngo-scandal-making-poverty-profitable.htm , 02 March 2018. 
26 Jordan L, ‘Mechanisms for NGO accountability’ GPPi research paper Series No. 3, Global Public Policy 
Institute- http://www.globalpublicpolicy.net , 2005,7. 
27 Moore M, Brown D and Honan J, ‘Building strategic accountability systems for International NGOs’ 
Issue 2 Accountability forum, Summer 2004, 31-43, 36. 
8 
 
legal ground determines whether accountability is as a result of the law, tradition, 
regulation or policy. The prudential ground demonstrates to the NGO whether failure to 
account will result in severe financial sanctions to the NGOs.  
As noted from the foregoing, questions on NGO accountability are broad in scope. Bendell 
argues that the questions directed at NGOs generally seek to determine the question of 
who should be accountable, why should they be accountable, to whom are they 
accountable, what are they accountable for and how should they apply accountability 
practices.28  
In relation to the question of who, Cavill and Sohail reason that identifying actors within 
the NGO who are charged with accountability is a complicated process as it results into 
what they term as the problem of many hands.29 That notwithstanding, its argued that  
accountability may generally lie with the organisation itself through organisational 
accountability, directors through personal accountability, members of the organisation 
through collective accountability and individuals within the NGO through individual 
responsibility. Bendell on other hand does not identify the actors but generally argues that 
the person or group that affects another person or group must be accountable to the 
affected.30 The writers provide a good starting point for a discussion on the persons 
responsible for accountability in NGOs. This study purposes to add onto that body of 
knowledge by focusing on the extent to which the law can solve the problem of many 
hands and clearly identify and allocate responsibilities in relation accountability in NGOs.  
In relation to the question of why, it is notable in the past, virtuous objectives and morals 
provided sufficient foundation for NGO legitimacy. Lloyd and Casas argue that currently, 
the foregoing is not sufficient and NGOs are under pressure to give proof of the positive 
impact created and demonstrate effective representation of the people they support.31 This 
pressure has led to the legitimacy crisis since the organisations are perceived as having 
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veered away from the purpose of their establishment.32 Ease of access to information, 
increased visibility and technological advancements have further contributed to such 
inquiries.33 The foregoing, coupled with continued criticism towards NGOs on the use of 
funds, power abuse, poor management and governance challenges explains why NGOs 
have to be accountable.  
In relation to the question of, to whom, most of the works analysed adopt a position of 
recognising the body or person to which an NGO should be accountable to. According to 
Najam’s conceptual framework, there are three groupings that effectively cover the broad 
range of likelihoods in so far as NGO accountability is concerned. The three distinct 
categories are accountability to patrons including the donors, accountability to clients 
including the communities they serve and accountability to the NGOs themselves.34  
Naidoo on the other hand identifies three levels of accountability for NGOs.35 First is 
upward accountability which is the accountability towards funders, regulatory regimes of 
the NGOs and compliance to any formal requirements that an organization needs to meet. 
This level of accountability has a legal basis with the entity holding the NGO accountable 
having control of the terms and conditions of the relationship.36 In view of the legal basis 
for this level of accountability it is noted that accountability therefore is predominantly 
upward at the expense of other stakeholders and this is a serious issue that requires legal 
redress.  
Second is downward accountability which entails accountability towards the people 
affected and/or being governed by the actions of the NGO. Werekoh argues that this 
approach gives room for beneficiaries to take part in the project through participation in 
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decision making, active involvement in project activities and learning.37 According to 
Banks, NGOs are to ensure that there exists mechanisms for accountability to beneficiaries 
through effective communication between the NGOs and the beneficiaries by use of either 
formal or semi-formal means.38 Whereas this is a viable model, Werekoh argues that the 
law more often than not fails to impose an obligation on NGOs to undertake downward 
accountability and this weakens accountability of NGOs have to their beneficiaries.39 The 
inadequacies in the law in providing for downward accountability leads to an 
accountability gap which this study focuses on with an intention of proposing legal 
solutions for bridging this accountability gap.  
The third form is horizontal accountability which is towards persons of the same level in 
an organization. This is also referred to as peer accountability40 or sideward 
accountability. Kilby argues that to achieve horizontal accountability, peer regulation 
measures taken should entail common standards of quality and accountability by NGOs 
and should be voluntarily agreed upon by the NGOs without any legally binding force.41 
In addition to the three levels above, Cavill and Sohail argue for a fourth level which they 
refer to as directional accountability which involves staff members’ commitment to 
overall vision, mission and organizational values leading up to the fulfilment of what is 
expected of them by their stakeholders.42 Notable is that this framework is premised on 
cooperation by concerned parties without which it is likely to be ineffectual. 
In relation to the question of what NGOs should be accountable for, Mosunova 
summarizes the key issues that raise accountability questions namely: legal and regulatory 
compliance, financial reporting and performance, safeguarding stakeholder interests and 
delivery to targeted persons.43 Ebrahim argues that NGO accountability entails functional 
and strategic accountability. The former refers to accountability for the particular actions 
                                                          
37 Werekoh K, ‘Accountability Systems of Non-Governmental Organisations’. 
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and programmes that NGOs are expected to perform while the latter refers to 
accountability related to the NGOs vision, mission, objectives, goals and policies.44 
Functional accountability forms a central part of NGO accountability because it concerns 
itself with proper resource allocation, sound implementation and the impact of an NGO’s 
activities in pursuance of its mission. Strategic accountability on the other hand, focuses 
on how NGOs carry out their activities in relation to their mission.  
In relation to the question of how, Ebrahim proposes an integrated approach to 
accountability by identifying five non-exhaustive but concrete accountability mechanisms 
that can either be a tool or a process. The five mechanisms are reports and disclosure 
statements and reporting, evaluations and performance assessments, industry self-
regulation; participation and social auditing.45 The tools and processes identified are 
geared towards meeting the external stakeholders’ needs and since one group of 
stakeholders may have considerable leverage on NGOs, then accountability will be 
skewed towards that group.46 For internal accountability, Mosunova argues that it may 
take the approach of adopting governance regulations, establishment of a board of 
directors, consistent financial reporting and the presence of internal audit committees and 
external auditors.47  
Accountability in the Kenyan perspective can only be loosely seen in the call for self-
regulation and this barely gives clarity and responsibility on the part of the NGOs. Self-
regulation is a vague term used to refer to the efforts of an NGO to regulate itself and 
further refer to efforts of groups of NGOs to set and enforce standards for all participants 
in the group.48 According to Moore and Stewart, NGOs need collective self-regulation to 
solve the challenges of accountability, evaluation, organisational growth and economies 
of scale.49 Gurgerty argues that weak government oversight and the inability to undertake 
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effective regulatory oversight also necessitate the need for self-regulation.50 This is 
important as self-regulation uptake by NGOs is intended to repair the NGOs legitimacy 
and credibility with the donors. 
Kameri’s position is that there is an undeniable role to be played by government in the 
regulation of NGOs in order to guard against misuse of resources and to safeguard against 
weakening of state’s legitimacy.51 However, it is possible that the government can use 
such powers as retaliation towards NGOs that advocate against certain organisations, 
stakeholders or the government itself. In advancing this argument, Trickler states that it is 
paramount that the governments through regulatory bodies do not use accountability as a 
way of retaliating and should not wield excessive powers against NGOs.52 
The question then becomes; who should be setting the guidelines that regulate NGOs? 
Moore and Stewart argue that in the first instance, the norms should be developed by the 
NGOs and only when they fail should the government step in.53 This approach is in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity54 which posits that decisions at the first 
instance should be made at the level that has closest proximity to the issue at hand. In light 
of this therefore, it is necessary and important for Kenya to have laws and regulations 
formulated with the requisite involvement of the public and participation of relevant 
stakeholders including donors, as is required by the Constitution of Kenya.55 This will   
encourage NGOs to execute their important contribution to the development process.  
Various authors’ positions on NGO accountability are influenced by different schools of 
thought. Those whose work is analysed in this section advance the position that 
accountability is indeed an essential part of NGO operations. While they are cognizant of 
the accountability issues and approaches in the NGO sector, they do not address the most 
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crucial aspect, namely how legislation and regulation should incorporate a holistic 
accountability mechanism for NGOs. This therefore leaves a research gap which this 
thesis seeks to address. 
1.7. Justification of the Study 
The research is meant to examine the status of NGO Accountability with due 
consideration of legislative provisions on NGO administrations in Kenya. There is a 
significant rift between the existing provisions and their implementation. A number of 
shortcomings are also evident in the current structures as on many occasions, they fail to 
include vital accountability concepts. The purpose of this research therefore is to present 
the inadequacies while exploring suitable solutions and recommendations likely to 
remedy the situation.  
1.8. Research Methodology 
The research will adopt a doctrinal approach and shall focus on the analysis of statutes, 
case law, and other legal sources. The doctrinal approach is suitable as the research seeks 
to undertake an analysis of the inadequacies in the legislative and regulatory framework 
on accountability of NGOs. This will include studying the existing laws on NGO 
accountability, cases relating to accountability and other literature specific to NGO 
accountability.   
The research will rely on solely on theoretical data from both primary and secondary 
sources. On primary sources, the study will examine international instruments, relating to 
the operations of NGOs, ascribed to by Kenya. The intention of the analysis of these 
instruments would be to ascertain the extent to which the Kenyan legislative and 
regulatory frameworks comply to the provisions of the treaties in relation to NGO 
operations generally and specifically on accountability.  
The research will further analyse primary data from local legislative and regulatory 
positions on NGOs and their provisions on accountability for the NGOs, the enforcement 
challenges and the need to recommend for the enactment of legislation to fill the gaps that 
remain unaddressed by the legislation on accountability by NGOs. Case laws on disputes 
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around NGO registration, accountability and general operations, shall also be relied on to 
establish the existence of accountability and enforcement mechanisms or lack thereof. 
Secondary sources will be consulted extensively including literature from various authors 
as   published in books, journals, working papers, research articles, theses, newspapers, 
reports and online platforms. An assessment of the diverse positions will be done to 
determine whether Kenyan frameworks are reflective of the same and what position is 
best suited for Kenya in relation to NGO accountability. 
A comparative analysis with particular interest in South Africa will be incorporated in 
order to compare the Kenyan NGO framework to the South African accountability 
mechanisms. Focus on South Africa over other states is due to the legislative and 
regulatory advancements in the country as compared to other African countries, 
particularly in relation to NGOs from which a productive comparison can be drawn. South 
Africa also happens to have one of the largest NGO sectors among developing and 
transitional nations in the world exceeding even the developing country average.56 The 
comparative approach is meant to eliminate any biased perceptions of the shortcomings 
encountered in the Kenyan case and determine whether there is need to make alterations 
to existing frameworks. It will also allow for assessment of systems generally assumed to 
be better or more advanced thus ensuring elimination of misconceived perfection and 
blind borrowing. 
1.9. Limitations of the study 
The research is basically a desktop analysis with its base on review of texts, existing laws, 
scholarly articles and court verdicts. While research has been done on the general topic of 
accountability, it is mostly restricted to the traditional corporate sector with little mention 
of accountability in NGO operations. In Kenya, minimal research has been done on NGO 
accountability and related areas thus   limiting information and resources. Reliance is 
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placed mainly on the domestic legal and regulatory frameworks which are not inclusive 
of views and perspectives of individuals. 
In the Kenyan context, concerns over accountability are common in corporate circles and 
specifically in profit generating entities and the government and state entities. As a result, 
there were not as many cases relating to NGO accountability in comparison with suits 
relating to accountability of other players in the corporate sector, to be relied on for the 
research. Recently there have been a few concerns raised, with NGOCB initiating action 
to deregister NGOs for allegations relating to non-accountability leading to suits that have 
set precedential records. 
Due to time constraints, field work was not possible and this also impeded the chances of 
conducting interviews with NGOs and regulatory bodies in the country to get an insightful 
perspective as to the accountability frameworks. 
1.10. Chapter breakdown 
This research is split into five chapters with the first chapter providing the background of 
the study by analysing corporate governance generally and why the same should apply to 
NGOs. Chapter one focuses on the specific principle of interest to the research which is 
accountability and how that plays out in the NGO sector. This chapter also states the 
hypothesis of the research, research objectives and the research questions which the 
research attempts to answer. The research methodology and limitations to the study are 
also be presented in this chapter. Present literature on the research was reviewed and gaps 
identified to offer an overview of the problem. 
Chapter two extensively discusses the theory informing the study that is the stakeholder 
theory as introduced in the first chapter. The chapter shall further discuss how the theory 
affects accountability mechanisms in the NGO sector. The theory adopted provides a lens 
through which the results of the study could be explained.     
The Kenyan Regulatory Framework of NGOs i.e. the NGO Act and its Regulations, the 
Public Benefits Organisation Act and other related NGO laws are analysed in Chapter 
three. The Chapter specifically looks at the provisions on accountability, self-regulation 
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and general regulation of NGOs. The chapter sought to understand how the gaps within 
the law contribute to non-accountability by NGOs and reforms required for better 
accountability practices.  
Chapter four undertakes a comparative study of NGOs laws in South Africa in order to 
establish the distinctive elements from the Kenyan framework. This allows for 
determination of what works best in initiatives to foster accountability. 
Chapter five provides the general synopsis, conclusion and the recommended position on 
the subject of discussion. It presents the final position on NGO accountability in response 








The need for NGOs to be accountable to all their stakeholders is supported by the ensuing 
discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of stakeholder accountability. This chapter 
will analyse the theory supporting stakeholder accountability, specifically, the stakeholder 
theory as conceived by Edward Freeman. A discussion of the theory will indicate the 
importance of proper stakeholder management by organisation. The stakeholder theory 
provides the basis for recognition of the wide range of stakeholders by organisations 
beyond the investors. This chapter will seek to establish how concepts from the theory can 
be tied to NGO accountability discussions.  
2.1 THEORY 
2.1.1 Stakeholder Theory 
2.1.1.1 Foundations of the Stakeholder Theory 
The theory is commonly referred to as Freeman’s stakeholder theory due to Edward 
Freeman’s extensive research in the area and its origins are traceable to the mid-1980s57. 
In that period, it is argued that the business environment was undergoing environmental 
turbulence and the traditional strategies were not adequate in resolving the challenges and 
supporting the development of new opportunities.58 The response to this problem was the 
emergence of the stakeholder approach. 
According to the stakeholder theory, the function of an organisation is to guarantee that 
the organisation takes into account wider societal interests that go beyond financial growth 
for investors. It argues that managers should understand the interests, relationships and 
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the interconnections of all the stakeholders and manage them for the long term success of 
the organisation.59 Freeman reasons that the foregoing is important since managerial 
actions affect a wide range of person or groups and in the same manner that the objectives 
of an organisation can be halted or affected by the actions a wide range of person or 
groups.60 
Donaldson and Preston, as cited by Freeman, contend that the theory is divided into four 
parts as follows: descriptive, instrumental, normative and managerial61 and that the four 
aspects of the theory are not differentiated but are embedded and intertwined.62 The 
descriptive part of the theory gives an explanation of the features and the conduct of an 
organisation. The instrumental approach stresses on identifying the stakeholders and the 
manner in which the stakeholders will be managed for purpose of achieving the objectives 
of the organisation. Stakeholder collaboration as envisioned in the instrumental approach 
results in high levels of trust from stakeholders, increased efficiency and more predictable 
outcomes. The managerial approach speaks to the needs of practitioners within the 
organization. The normative approach is a means of discerning the function of the 
organisation and speaks to the morality of actions undertaken by the organisation.63  
2.1.1.2 Scope of the Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholders may consist of organisations, groups and individuals interested in the 
operations and output of an entity, which then means that they may be affected by the 
organisation or are essential to the survival of an organisation.64 Developed as a 
stakeholder management method, stakeholder prioritization is applied to determine which 
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stakeholder to give precedence to, based on a number of issues.65 These include power, 
knowledge and general preferences amongst other reasons.66 Clarkson classifies 
stakeholders as primary and secondary stakeholders. He defines primary as the group 
which the organisation needs for it to exist as a going concern and the secondary group as 
the category that impacts or is affected by the organisation but is not critical for its 
survival.67 Mitchell on the hand classifies stakeholders as latent, expectant or definite 
stakeholders based on the number of characteristics held by the stakeholder at the time.68 
The criterion ranks stakeholders based on three characteristics that are: the stakeholders’ 
ability to influence an organisation; the validity of the stakeholder’s relationship with the 
organisation and; how critical the stakeholders claim is on the organisation.  
According to the stakeholder theory, stakeholder management should focus more on 
working on the relationships rather than on the groupings 69 as stakeholders lack 
homogeneity thus vary across organisations.70 Freeman argues that it is important to 
recognize the varied interests of stakeholders in the determination of legitimacy and their 
involvement in an organisation’s operations. This recognition would help in striking a 
balance between risks and rewards derived from different stakeholders and in helping an 
organisation reconcile conflicting interests of stakeholders hence limit retaliation.71 From 
the managers point of view, Freeman argues that there is need to promote basic rights in 
every action undertaken, transparency in any engagements with stakeholders, recognition 
and regulation of conflict interests by managers.72 
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2.1.1.3 Justifications of the Stakeholder Theory 
There are justifications towards this shift and towards inclusion of stakeholders in 
governance of organisations suggesting that their participation is an effective means of 
improving efficiency, competition and economic success. Freeman argues that the theory 
is a means to achieve practical, efficient and ethical management of organisations and that 
for its long term survival, an organisation should serve multiple stakeholder interests 
rather than shareholder interests alone.73 This means that, rather than viewing stakeholders 
as ‘the end’, they need to also be considered as the ‘means to an end’ with the end being 
premised on the need to allow organisations serve a wider public purpose. 74 The bottom-
line of the stakeholder theory is that organisation must purpose to ensure fair, honest and 
ethical treatment of all stakeholders. 
Ethics in the corporate world has always been a contentious issue and the stakeholder 
theory offers an opportunity for reconciliation. In their day to day operations, 
organisations affect the society in multiple ways but despite this fact, most fail to 
incorporate ethical practises in their operations.75 This affects their ability to attain 
accountability and transparency. Through application of the stakeholder theory, 
accountability and transparency is fostered within organisations since all interests are 
considered in decision making among other areas of management. Rebuttals by Freeman 
of Friedman’s stockholder theory position on the purpose of business being maximization 
of profits are demonstrative of the ethical connotations which influence the stakeholder 
theory. Its application goes beyond profit making to include ethical and moral perspectives 
in conduct of business.76 
Management influenced by the stakeholder theory also allows for the organisations in 
question to make better informed decisions from the input from stakeholders thus 
promoting public interest which in turn builds trust thus minimising regulatory restrictions 
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by the state.77 Arguments by stakeholder theorists suggest that stakeholder-based entities 
should not only be managed by parties affected by decisions and actions of the entity but 
also that their independence from the state be maintained and that governance should be 
geared towards social good.78 This installs a sense of ownership and encourages 
participation by stakeholders.79 Such participation results in reduced business constraints 
likely to affect an organisations operations. It also allows for prior preparation which helps 
in elimination of potential risks along with enhancing the understanding of criticisms 
levelled against the organisation and finding suitable solutions.80  
2.1.1.4 Stakeholder theory and related disciplines 
Extensive discussions on the stakeholder theory have been had since its inception resulting 
in the emergence of multiple interrelated disciplines and in some instances these have 
been marred with confusion. One such development is the political stakeholder theory81 
which relates to the role of the state as a stakeholder. In the context of this thesis, political 
stakeholder theory is based on the superiority of the state over all other stakeholders in the 
NGO sector. The compulsive powers and capabilities held only by the state place it at an 
advantage over other stakeholders. 
Aside from having the ability to layout the regulatory and organisational framework 
governing various entities, states are capable of directly and indirectly influencing other 
relevant stakeholders by putting in place predetermined transactions amongst them.82 
State superiority is premised on the prioritization model that is often adopted by NGOs 
where the NGOs, through various means establish which stakeholder they stand to benefit 
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from the most and give priority to that stakeholder.83 Prioritization of the state is informed 
by the power it holds. Donor prioritization on the other hand, is informed by resource 
dependency theory, under which priority of stakeholders is determined by their ability to 
provide resources to the NGOs.84 According to the resource dependency theory, NGOs 
place reliance on external sources of financial support which in turn contributes to loss of 
autonomy as the dependency makes them susceptible to external control.85  Prioritization 
under the circumstances discussed has led NGOs to make reports only to donors and 
governments and not to the other stakeholders who do not have as much power or 
resources over NGOs. NGOs should consider the interests of all stakeholders as is 
expected by the stakeholder theory to ensure that the various stakeholder’s interests are 
taken into account.86 
From the foundations of the stockholder theory, it is evident that it is also closely related 
to the stakeholder theory. According to Friedman, the stockholder theory is premised on 
moral purpose and responsibility of an entity.87 To support this notion, Friedman further 
states that shareholder wealth maximization as per the stockholder theory must be done 
with due consideration of legal provisions and moral implications.88 Operating in a 
voluntary contractual relationship, the executives and the stockholders are charged with 
specific obligations in a principal-agent model. Acting as the agents of the stockholders, 
the executives have to, in performing their duties, act in accordance with the directives 
and expectations of the stockholders.89 This fiduciary relationship is similar to the one 
between management and stakeholders but in the case of stockholder theory, the 
                                                          
83 Berens W, ‘Customers, employees, NGOs-Which stakeholders do really count? A holistic conceptual 
framework for stakeholder prioritization and expectation management’ Working Paper Number 15-1, 1 -< 
http://www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/ctrl> May 2012. 
84 Yuesti A and   Rustiarini N, ‘Accountability problem of Non- Government Organisations on practice and 
perspective stakeholder theory’ Vol 15 Journal of International Accounting Auditing and Taxation, 
September 2017, 72. 
85 Mitchell G, ‘Strategic Responses to Resource Dependence Among Transnational NGOs Registered in the 
United States’ 25 (1) Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Non-profit Organisations, February 
2014, pp. 67-91. 
86 Yuesti A et al, ‘Accountability problem of Non- Government Organisations’, 78. 
87 Mertens K, ‘Milton Friedman and social responsibility – An ethical defence of the stockholder theory’ 
Unpublished thesis, The University of Oslo, 2013, 6. 
88 Phillips R et al, ‘What stakeholder theory is not’, 493. 
89 Mertens K, ‘Milton Friedman and social responsibility’, 5. 
23 
 
manager’s sole motivation is always a positive increment in shareholder wealth as is 
demanded by the wealth maximization concept.90 
Owing to the similarity in models of application, manifestations of the stakeholder theory 
are commonly confused with corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts.91 The 
confusion is as a result of the fact that most organisations have deliberately taken up 
corporate social responsibility initiatives to foster relations with stakeholders in an effort 
to avert the pressure to do so. Growing interest by the stakeholders themselves has 
contributed to this shift92 and demands for accountability from NGOs by donors are a clear 
demonstration of such pressures. The two concepts have been discussed by various 
authors concurrently but there is a major variation since CSR relies on separation of 
business and societal needs and treating the two differently. Stakeholder theory on the 
other hand argues that one cannot separate the two.93 
Overall, the stakeholder theory seeks to promote fairness in an organisation by ensuring 
all stakeholders are treated as equals in spite of the variation in their inputs and general 
contribution.94 Application of the stakeholder theory fosters accountability in 
organisations as it seeks to have the problems of accountability solved in a synthesized 
manner. Such problems include: reporting and disclosure, social audit, self- regulation, 
performance assessment and evaluation.95 
2.1.1.5 Criticism of the Stakeholder theory 
While the stakeholder theory received positive reception in most parts, criticism has been 
levelled against its application. One of the most notable critics is Elaine Sternberg whose 
arguments revolve around the incompatibility of stakeholder theory with corporate 
governance. Arguments by Sternberg are structured in the form of inquiries as to the 
proponents of the stakeholder theory.  
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According to Stenberg, the principle of equal accountability to all stakeholders as required 
by the stakeholder theory is contradictory to the position in corporate governance that 
holds directors accountable to shareholders.96 In support of this argument, Marcoux 
outlines three possible versions of equity that should be applied in order to attain the 
requisite equity for an organization’s stakeholders. The first is egalitarianism, which is 
based on John Rawls theory of justice and requires that distribution to stakeholders is done 
in a socially just manner. Second is equalitarianism which requires that all stakeholders 
have, in equal share, all entitlements and obligations.  The third is pareto consequentialism 
which involves making at least one better whilst maintaining the status of another.97  In 
the analysis of this position, Phillips, Freeman and Wicks argue that by highlighting these 
three concepts, Marcoux omits the strongest version of interpretation of equity which is 
meritocracy.98 Under meritocracy, an organisation can employ the use of fairness in 
distribution of benefits so that there is a proper balance between benefits distributed to 
stakeholders as against the benefits received from the stakeholders. They further argue 
that key distinctions among stakeholders can be made such that each organisation can then 
have an opportunity to handle the matter of distribution differently depending on its own 
particular version of stakeholder theory.99 
Marcoux criticizes the stakeholder theory further by adding that it is primarily concerned 
with distribution of financial outputs.100 He argues that stakeholder theory is concerned 
with who receives how much of the resources and why, thus leading to a conflict between 
investors and other stakeholders over resource allocation. In response to this, Freeman 
argues that distribution of financial outputs is only but a part of the stakeholder theory. He 
states that the crucial part which the critics fail to recognize is about processes and 
procedural justice. This he argues, gives room for stakeholder input in decisions relating 
to how resources are allocated and decision on who should benefit from the outcomes of 
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such decisions.101 Freeman cites research showing that stakeholders accept results when 
they consider the process of arriving at such decisions to be fair even in cases where the 
results themselves are poor. In support of the foregoing, Phillip, Freeman and Wicks add 
that stakeholder theorists and critics should be fully cognizant of the procedural 
prescriptions of the theory along with the distributive aspects.102 This is because focus on 
distribution of resources and ignoring the processes is what leads to the notion that 
distribution of outputs is a limitation on stakeholder theory. Notable is that measurable 
outputs are not the only priority of distribution because other aspects can be distributed 
including information. 
The stakeholder theory has been termed a tool of opportunist management which allows 
for immoral managers to prioritize their interests over all else.103 Such opportunistic 
tendencies are backed by the management’s claims of benefiting the organisation through 
maximization of contributions by other stakeholders. This notion is derived from 
Sternberg’s criticism on the lack of performance evaluation mechanisms for actions 
undertaken by management. In counter arguing this position, Freeman and other authors 
state that there have been considerable reports in mismanagement of organisations and 
managerial opportunistic behaviours noted under other theories like the agency theory. 
Therefore, the occurrence of opportunistic behaviour is not a creation of stakeholder 
theory and is not specific to stakeholder theory only. To the contrary, they opine that the 
creation of more accountability obligations and duties of care to more constituencies for 
managers will ensure that managers are less likely to engage in self-dealing.104  
Friedman’s stockholder theory has long been viewed as an opposition to the stakeholder 
theory. According to Friedman, businesses are made successful by maximization of 
profits.105 This capitalist approach is contrary to the stakeholder theory that considers 
business success a direct result of solid relationships combined with good production and 
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maximization of profit with support of the communities.106 Stakeholder theory further 
takes into consideration the potential implications of a manager’s actions on concerned 
parties by incorporating the accountability obligations as stated in the preceding 
paragraph. This is unlike the stockholder theory position which only considers the interest 
of stockholders among other parties.107 
Stenberg further argues that the stakeholder theory fails to give an organisation purpose 
of existence and rather requires that businesses balance the interests of stakeholders with 
no long term value added to the owners.108 She argues that the stakeholder theory makes 
the conduct of business impractical since businesses which focus on maximization of 
profits rather than balancing stakeholder interests are not recognized under the stakeholder 
theory.109  
In addition to this position, Marcoux argues that while stakeholder theorist rejects the 
maximization of profits objective, they still fail to offer helpful guidance.110  Phillip, 
Freeman and Wicks agree that in some sense, this critique is correct as the theory does not 
provide a procedure for daily administrative decision making due to the level of 
generalization at which the discussion is taking place.111 According to them, the essence 
of the theory is to give the system by which stakeholder obligations are derived and 
caution that managers must be accountable for the interests of all stakeholders when 
making decisions. They add that at that level of abstraction it is not possible to indicate in 
advance what these interests are to be and how they may be accounted for due to the 
numerous ways in which an organisation operates. In furtherance of this argument, the 
authors propose that there is need for legislation to ensure management considers interests 
of stakeholder as a mandatory obligation.112 This will ensure the contributions by 
stakeholders will not be dismissed at the decision making stage.  
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The stakeholder theory has also been criticized for failing to take into consideration the 
different roles played by various stakeholders. This variation extends to their objectives 
which may vary in terms of longevity, risks assumed and profits. According to critics, this 
is advanced by the lack of guidelines in the selection and categorization process of 
stakeholders. Consequently, determination of the needs of stakeholders and of the extent 
of benefits derived from and to be granted to stakeholders is rendered impossible.113 
Existing legal provisions fail to remedy this situation since, rather than offering a clear 
framework on stakeholder interests, they attempt to outline provisions covering all 
stakeholders without specificity as to the limits or extent of their roles and obligations.114 
Considering the position of law, Benedict further argues that this criticism can only be 
dismissed upon the introduction of well-structured laws that are responsive to the problem 
at hand.115 
Another criticism is based solely on the misconception of the stakeholder theory as a 
comprehensive moral doctrine116  A theory is considered a comprehensive moral doctrine 
when all moral questions can be answered by the theory and where it has the ability, with 
no reference to other theories, to cover the entire moral universe.117 Stakeholder theory is 
a theory of organizational ethics and as such does not respond to all moral questions as is 
the case with comprehensive moral doctrines.118 While the question of morality arises in 
events such as human rights violations, it does not always involve stakeholder based 
obligations. Morality concerns may be influenced by concepts that are not necessarily 
informed by the stakeholder theory. The duty to respect human rights is inherent for all 
entities regardless of their general operations; therefore failure to uphold such rights is a 
violation irrespective of the stakeholder’s position.119 As a result of this distinction, 
criticism against the stakeholder theory in light of it being a comprehensive moral doctrine 
does not suffice. The criticisms levelled if considered critically, do in fact indicate lacunas 
in the application of the stakeholder theory. However, they are not sufficient to lead to the 
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elimination of the theory altogether but rather offer an opportunity for re-evaluation to 
address the issues that draw back application of the theory. Besides, the criticisms are 
mostly based on misinterpretations of the stakeholder theory which does not actually 
imply that all stakeholders be treated equally regardless of existing variations.120 The 
stakeholder theory has to be applied reflectively in order to tap into the limitless 
managerial prescriptions and implications.121 
That entities cannot do without stakeholders, contributes greatly to the pragmatic nature 
of the stakeholder theory since it allows for proper management, causing stakeholders to 
respond positively in a general exchange model.122 Its vitality to corporate governance is 
undeniable. The theory is informed by optimum business output and improvement 
potential with focus on creation of value and proper business management.123 While it 
may appear unnecessary to adopt changes in law to incorporate the stakeholder theory 
since it is not currently prohibited, there is need for enactment of legislation that is 
reflective of the elements of the theory. This would not only advance its viability but also 
ensure that stakeholder interests are not undermined at any given point.  
2.2 CONCLUSION  
The stakeholder theory offers a basis upon which arguments for accountability to 
stakeholders can be founded. With the stakeholder theory advancing the argument for 
stakeholder engagement it is demonstrative of the need to look at organisations beyond 
the profit generation capabilities and beyond investors. The theory is crucial to the 
discussion on NGO accountability since it directly deals with the importance of involving 
stakeholders in operations which can then enhance holistic accountability.  
Accountability problems have to be analysed with due consideration of implementation 
and enforcement measures.  The diverse accountability mechanisms discussed in Chapter 
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one of the thesis offer a wide range of measures that can be applied in an effort to resolve 
accountability problems. In light of the foregoing, the accountability mechanisms 
discussed and the theoretical basis discussed in this Chapter will be used as a threshold 
upon which the legal and regulatory frameworks discussed in Chapter three can be 





THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR NGOS IN KENYA 
3.0 INTRODUCTION  
The legal and regulatory framework for NGOs in Kenya has undergone a number of 
developments over the years. While progress has been made on making necessary 
adjustments on various aspects, NGO accountability is yet to be achieved holistically. 
Continued breach of the accountability provisions by NGOs may be attributed to the 
inadequacy of the legislative and regulatory framework in providing for a holistic 
mechanism on accountability of NGOs. This chapter will analyse the specific 
inadequacies in the legal and regulatory framework for regulation of NGOs in Kenya 
contribute to deficits in NGO accountability to stakeholders and the specific reforms 
required in order to foster accountability. An analysis of the international laws and their 
influence on domestic legislation will be done so as to determine the level of compliance. 
Consideration will be given to the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, the NGO Coordination 
Act of 1990 and its regulations and the Public Benefits Organization Act of 2013. These 
instruments shall further be discussed in light of accountability mechanisms, tools and 
processes with due consideration of the concerned parties in order to allow for 
identification of gaps and establishment of potential solutions. 
3.1 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LAWS IN THE NGO SECTOR IN 
KENYA  
Prior to 1990, non-profit organizations were registered under different regimes including 
companies limited by guarantee, trusts, foundations and societies. In relation to the 
regulatory framework, non-profit organizations were regulated by different entities and 
through different mechanisms such as the Ministry of culture and social services, the 
Office of the Attorney General, the Ministry of Gender and Youth or through specific 
legislations such as the Kenya Red Cross Society Act, Companies Act, Societies Act or 
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Trustees Act amongst others.124 In practice, the organizations operated and undertook their 
activities in line with the diverse policies and legal structures under which they were 
registered and this led to complications in creating a uniform regulatory structure.125 
During the period 1963 to 1990 there was lack of government’s appreciation of the work 
undertaken by NGOs and its role in the development of the country because of the absence 
of a national policy or framework governing NGOs. In 1986, the ministry of culture and 
social services unsuccessfully attempted to legislate NGO operations by drafting a paper 
to the cabinet on the need to regulate the operations of NGOs in Kenya.126  
In 1989, a presidential edict was issued for officials to commence the development of a 
framework for the regulation and coordination of NGOs under the office of the president 
which led to the appointment of an inter-ministerial taskforce to handle the process.127 The 
need for the law was triggered by doubt on the genuineness of NGOs after several  NGOs 
were cited for acquisition of arms amongst others ills.128 On the other hand, NGOs were 
also advocating for an elaborate law that took into consideration their concerns. 
Nonetheless, their views were side-lined.129  
In view of the suspicion between the government and NGOs, it is argued that the context 
in which the NGO Act was developed was not favourable for NGOs. Participants in the 
NGO sector strongly opposed the law on the grounds that the provisions were not creating 
an enabling operating environment but rather aimed at oppressing and controlling the 
sector. This led to a number of discussions between sector participants and the government 
resulting in compromise proposals which were presented to the government in the form 
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of a draft bill which formed the basis of the NGO Act.130 The history and the process of 
the development of the law is important as it gives insights to the genesis of the tension 
that exists between the government and the NGOs. It is also indicative of why the laws 
enacted may not be creating an enabling environment for NGOs which leads to issues of 
non-accountability. 
3.2 THE GENERAL NGO REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN KENYA  
This section explores the international treaties, the position of the Kenyan law and 
examines the extent of accountability provisions as initiated by the existing provisions. 
The legal and regulatory framework on NGOs in Kenya is grounded in the Constitution 
of Kenya, 2010 which is the supreme law of the land. The bill of rights is integral to the 
operations of NGOs as it lays the foundation for the work and idea of NGOs.  
In relation to the sector specific legislation, in 1990, the NGO Act of 1990 and the 
regulations therein were enacted in an effort to ensure that there exists a single authority 
for registration and regulation of NGOs. However, this was done in the absence of a 
national policy on NGOs. The implementation led to queries about the effectiveness of 
the law since in circumstances where the law was silent or led to misunderstandings, there 
was no policy position to make reference to. In 1996, the NGOCB thought it necessary to 
have a national policy on NGOs and in January 2006, Sessional Paper Number 1 of 2006 
containing the National Policy on Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO policy) was 
adopted by the parliament.131 Both the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 under its Article 2(5) 
and the NGO policy recognize the provisions of international conventions and treaties 
governing the operations and activities of NGOs. The policy also recognizes NGOs’ 
contribution to the economy and thus proposes mechanisms for better regulation and 
coordination.132 
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The PBO Act of 2013, once effected, is meant to provide a more advanced model of 
regulation covering accountability extensively in public benefit organizations in Kenya.   
3.2.1 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 
In August 2010, Kenya promulgated a new constitution and based on the foundation of 
this progressive constitution, the legal environment in Kenya has been generally 
supportive of NGOs. The Constitution upholds the freedom of association, freedom of 
expression and freedom of access to information as provided for in the international and 
regional legal instruments.133 The right to associate, express oneself and have peaceful 
assembly are the essential principles upon which NGOs operate and as such NGOs may 
not exist unless the law gives significant protection to these fundamental freedoms.134  
The freedoms discussed have to a large extent, been respected in Kenya save for some 
instances where the government has used the Public Order Act to call off opposition135, 
civil society assemblies and demonstrations.136 The government of Kenya has continued 
to provide the space for exercising freedoms discussed. However, with the terrorist attacks 
in the past decade in Kenya, there is increased fear and the national security machinery 
has limited the formation and operations of some groups especially for youths and citizens 
aligned to Islam. This was particularly evident when the government attempted to close 
the operations of two key organisations Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) and Haki 
Africa for alleged links to terrorist groups.137 
3.2.2 The International Framework  
The Constitution of Kenya is cognizant of   the vitality of international law. According to 
Article 2(5) of the Constitution of Kenya, treaties and conventions to which Kenya is a 
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signatory become part of the laws of Kenya upon ratification.138 Article 2(5) of the 
Constitution of Kenya accords international law a prominent role in the Kenyan domestic 
legal system by directly including ratified treaty law as part of the Kenyan legal system 
thus making it a valid source of law. There are a number of international treaties with both 
express and indirect provisions meant to guide operations of NGOs at various levels 
including registration and at the operation stage. As a member state, Kenya is obligated to 
ensure implementation of the provisions therein. 
In relation to formation and membership, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
(UDHR) for instance, explicitly provides for freedom of association. It gives rights to 
persons to form groups, to organize peaceful meetings and prohibits any person from 
being forced to belong to any group without their consent. The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic and Social 
Rights (ICESR) to which Kenya is a state party, also guarantee the freedom of expression, 
the right to hold peaceful assemblies and the freedom to associate. In Non-Governmental 
Organizations Co-ordination Board v EG & 5 others (2015) eKLR139 , Waki J, in 
determining whether the freedom of association was infringed, referred first to the binding 
nature of principles and values derived from rules of international laws as ratified by 
Kenya. In its determination, the court held that indeed the NGOCB had violated the 
freedom of association of the first respondents by failing to register their organization for 
want of a desirable name. The said violation was owing to the fact that it was in 
contravention, not only of Article 36 of the constitution, but also of Article 20 of the 
UDHR, Article 22 of the ICCPR and Article 10 of the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights (ACHPR) which provide that every individual has a right to freely 
associate with others. Reference was also made to Civil Liberties Organisation v Nigeria, 
ACmHPR Communication No 101/93 (1995),140 where the African Commission on 
Human and People’s Rights established that the freedom of association is an individual 
right thereby imposing an obligatory mandate on the state to refrain from interference. 
The Commission went on to state that mechanisms need to be put in place to ensure 
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citizens can freely join association. The appeal was therefore dismissed for lack of merit. 
The former case is demonstrative of the need to abide by constitutional provisions and 
international laws by regulatory bodies as early on as upon registration. 
The international framework, similarly to the constitution, is integral to the operations of 
NGOs as it also lays the foundation for the work and idea of NGOs.  
3.2.3  The Companies Act, 2015  
The Companies Act is the primary Act for governing companies in Kenya. A brief analysis 
and comparison of the same to the NGO Act will be undertaken to so as to gauge the level 
of regulation of NGOs vis-a-vis regulation of companies on specifically financial 
reporting.  
3.3 NGO SECTOR SPECIFIC FRAMEWORK 
3.3.1 The NGO Coordination Act No. 19 of 1990 (NGO Act) 
The NGO Act is the primary legislation governing NGO operations in Kenya. It 
establishes a regulatory Board known as the NGOCB and a self-regulatory agency to 
govern the NGOs known as Non-Governmental Organisations Council (NGO Council). 
The NGO Council is the collective forum for all NGOs registered under the NGO Act.  
Section 24 of the NGO Act mandates the NGO Council to give advice to the NGOCB in 
relation to the code of conduct and such other statutes as may be necessary for the 
regulation of NGOs on a number of matters including national security and training.  
The purpose of the NGO Act was to create a unifying legislation for the registration and 
coordination of the activities of NGOs.141 The NGO Act became effective on 15 June 1992 
and provided a six-month transition period for the affected organizations.142 This period 
was later extended by three months to 15 February 1993 during which all existing NGOs 
were required to register with the NGOCB.143 The Act provides for various corporate 
governance and accountability aspects but has failed consolidate all organizations under 
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its umbrella thus leading to multiplicity of registered entities with similar models of 
operation and absence of a holistic approach to accountability for NGOs.  
3.3.2 The NGO Regulations  
The NGO Coordination Regulations144 were also enacted under the NGO Act in order to 
back the operations of NGOs and as a subsidiary legislation to the 1990 Act. The 
regulations generally deal with the registration, deregistration, conduct and administration 
of NGOs in Kenya. 
3.3.3 The NGO Code of Conduct 
The NGO Act provides for a code of conduct applicable to NGOs by mandating NGOC 
to develop the code of conduct.145  The Act further requires the code of conduct to be 
approved by the NGOCB and gazetted, therefore placing legal compliance obligations on 
NGOs.146 Pursuant to the provisions of the NGO Act, the code of conduct was developed 
and gazetted on 8th September, 1995. The code has seven guiding principles including 
probity, self-regulation, justice, service, cooperation, prudence and respect.147 The 
intention of the code was to standardize the conduct, action and behaviour of NGOs as 
well as putting in place mechanisms to ensure that the NGOs comply with the set 
standards. Every registered organization is expected to apply and observe the provisions 
of the code.148 Failure to abide by the provisions is considered a breach of the code and is 
subject to regulatory action as detailed in Part V of the code.149 The code establishes the 
Regulatory Committee150 which is mandated with promoting and maintaining compliance 
to the rules and regulations amongst other functions.151 
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3.3.4 The Public Benefit Organization Act of 2013(PBO Act) 
The PBO Act of 2013 is intended to provide a framework for the regulation of the affairs 
and the conduct of public benefit organizations in Kenya. The PBO Act introduces a 
number of provisions in the areas of accountability, self-regulation, liberty to associate, 
and public participation amongst others.152  
The PBO Act is yet to be operationalized despite court orders being issued to that effect. 
In the Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Cabinet Secretary Devolution and 
Planning & 3 others153  petitioners filed the petition following the respondents failure to 
provide an effective date for the PBO Act thus failing to trigger its commencement for 
over two years. The petition was allowed by the court and it was held that the failure to 
provide a commencement date for the PBO Act, was in violation of Articles 1, 10, 73, 94, 
116(2), 129 and 153(4) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. An order was therefore issued 
compelling the respondent to issue and gazette a commencement date within fourteen days 
of the judgement rendered on 31st October, 2016.   
Despite the above ruling the Cabinet Secretary is yet to appoint a commencement date. 
Subsequently, in 2015, the Truth and Justice and Trusted Society of Human Rights 
Alliance filed contempt of court proceedings against the Cabinet Secretary for the 
Ministry of Devolution and Planning and the Attorney General for failing to commence 
the PBO Act as directed by the High Court.154 It was held that the court directive should 
be implemented. However, to date the Cabinet Secretary has not issued the effective date 
for the law.  
The PBO Act is meant to bring about sanity in the operating environment by creating a 
supporting environment for public benefits organisations in Kenya.155 In light of the 
foregoing, an analysis of the PBO Act is therefore important for purposes of this research. 
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The PBO Act envisages the creation of the National Federation of Public Benefits 
Organizations, which will act as the overarching body for all public benefit organizations 
registered under the PBO Act as well as oversee the self-regulation mechanisms within 
the industry.156 
Efforts towards internal governance are also evident in the PBO Act which contains 
provisions to the effect that PBOs are to keep proper books of account to be presented to 
the Public Benefit Organizations Regulatory Authority (PBOA) within six months.157 
The PBO Act is a great improvement from the current NGO Act. However, as discussed 
in detail in part 3.4, it fails to cater for the holistic and clear accountable system that is 
advocated for in this research. When compared with companies, one notes that the laws 
relating to companies makes them more accountable as it is very clear and the system is 
holistic and encompasses most of the stakeholders involved. The Companies Act has clear 
guidelines on financial reporting, accountability to stakeholder, governance requirements 
amongst other aspects pertaining to Companies registered under it. There have been 
instances where conflict has arisen with Regulatory bodies established under the NGO 
Act exercising their mandate on entities registered under the company act. 
Considering the challenges encountered in regulation, there is need to reconcile the 
provisions contained in the Acts, regulations and policies discussed above with 
constitutional provisions. This means respect for national values included therein, the bill 
of rights and international laws by extension considering the obligations imposed upon 
ratification. Such reconciliation will see to the end of challenges encountered in regulation 
of NGOs as discussed in subsequent parts of this chapter resulting in improved 
accountability across the board. 
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3.4 THE WEAKNESSES OF THE NGO SECTOR LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN 
RELATION TO ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS 
3.4.1 Who is accountable? 
3.4.1.1 Definition provisions and the implications on accountability 
The definition of an NGO158 is specific on what an NGO is and categorizes NGOs into 
international or national NGOs. The definition provided presupposes that all private, 
voluntary and not for profit entities that are for public interest are NGOs. However, as 
explained before, this definition is over-inclusive and vague. There are different legal 
frameworks in Kenya (other than the NGO Act) that allow for registration of organizations 
that would ordinarily fall within the definition of an NGO as provided in the NGO Act. 
Such organisations include companies limited by guarantee, trusts and foundations. 
Whereas such organisations may fall within that definition, the regulation of such 
organizations is vested under different legislative and regulatory frameworks other than 
the NGO Act. This position makes the implementation of a holistic accountability 
framework for multiple organisations under the multiple legal regimes, almost 
impossible.159 
The PBO Act on the other hand, renames the NGOs to PBOs and defines them as 
organisations registered under the PBO Act for purposes of engaging in public benefit 
activities. The PBOs may be voluntary, membership or non-membership, autonomous, 
non-partisan, non-profit making and should operate locally, nationally or 
internationally.160 The PBO Act goes further to expressly exclude from its definition of 
PBOs a number of organizations including trade unions, religious organizations, societies 
and community based organizations.161 Kalii argues that upon commencement of the PBO 
Act, all organisations that have a not for profit reference and are registered under other 
laws, including under the Companies Act and Trustees Act, will have to wind up or 
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dissolve and register afresh under the PBO Act.162 However, it is notable that the fifth 
schedule of the PBO Act has transitional provisions which requires organizations that are 
registered under the NGO Act to transition to the PBO Act thus repealing the NGO Act. 
The PBO Act does not make any reference to transitioning of the entities registered under 
other Acts.   
The PBO Act was expected to correct the confusion and ensure clarity in definition as 
well as be the unifying law for all not for profit organisations. Based on the analysis of 
the definition in the two Acts, it is doubtful as to whether the issue of multiplicity of 
registrations will be cured by the coming into effect of the PBO Act. It is also clear that 
the PBO Act will not be the unifying law for all not for profit organizations. The sector 
will continue to witness multiple and overlapping legal framework on registrations thus 
making it difficult to implement coherent and coordinated policies for the sector.  
A number of concerns have been raised as a result of the legislative framework making 
room for many forms of registrations for not for profit entities. Organisations have the 
latitude to choose how they want to be registered and the requirements they are able to 
fulfil act as determining factors. Interference by the NGOCB often transcends the limits 
of entities registered as NGOs and conflicts have arisen after the NGOCB attempted to 
deregister entities163 even outside of their jurisdiction.  In Cabinet Secretary Ministry of 
Interior & Co-ordination of National Government & 6 others Ex-parte Africa Centre 
for Open Governance & 7 others,164 the applicant sought among other orders, an order of 
certiorari to quash the decision of the 4th Respondent, the Executive Director of  the 
NGOCB, that urged and directed the 5th and 6th Respondent to close down the operations 
of the 1st Ex-Parte Applicant (AfriCOG) in order to allow for the committee to work with 
the Ex-parte Applicant to meet the Regulation and compliance needs of the 3rd 
Respondent(NGOCB). 
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The applicants argued that the letter containing the decision cited a legal regime that did 
not apply to the applicant as they were registered as Company limited by guarantee under 
the Companies Act, 2015 and were therefore not bound by the NGO Act. Since there was 
no legal provision empowering the respondents to act as they did, they had no powers 
whatsoever to make demands, issue directives and/or recommendations whatsoever 
relating to the 1st applicant’s activities and/or operations.  
In its determination the court was guided by the doctrine of ultra vires stating that where 
the law exhaustively provides for the jurisdiction of an executive body or authority, the 
body or authority must operate within those limits and ought not to expand its jurisdiction 
through administrative craft or innovation.  Based on this and in consideration of the 
provisions of the NGO Act on the duties of the board, it was apparent that the said 
provisions applied where registration and co-ordination of entities falling within the scope 
of definition for NGOs in Kenya were concerned. It was therefore held that the NGOCB 
actions were out of place and the court issued an order of certiorari sought, thereby 
quashing the decision of the NGOCB. 
The court also noted, relying on Mohamed Aktar Kana vs. Attorney General,165 that the 
numerous suits being filed against the said Respondents revolving around abuse of their 
powers are indicative of failure to adhere to the rule of law as required of them under 
Article 10 of the Constitution. Aside from the demonstrated lack of understanding and 
appreciation of the constitution, abidance by the provisions of the NGO Act under which 
they operate is also wanting and depicts the impunity of yesteryears thriving in the 
executive arm of Government. The deduction from this was that state organs or officers 
need to stick to the straight and narrow whilst exercising their powers and rely on the 
powers to bring them back in line when they step outside. 
The need for clarity and consistency in the provisions of the law regarding multiplicity of 
the registration of not for profit organisations is irrefutable. For a sustainable solution, the 
law needs to provide an enriched definition of NGOs or PBOs that incorporates all not for 
profit organisations and provides for their regulation under a single regulator. This will 
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simplify the regulatory regime thus bringing about a holistic accountability structure. An 
example of such clarity can be borrowed from Tanzania where in 2019, the Government 
of Tanzania through the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, No 3 of  2019 
(the Miscellaneous Amendments Act), introduced amendments to the Companies Act166 
and the NGO Act.167 Pursuant to the amendment all organizations registered as companies 
limited by guarantee and having certificate of compliance that allowed them to operate as 
NGOs, were deregistered and removed from the register of companies and were required 
to re-register as NGOs as provided under the NGO Act.168 The Miscellaneous 
Amendments Act further amended the definition of NGOs to make it explicit by including 
Community Based Organisations (CBOs) which had previously been excluded from the 
definition.169 Through this amendment, the legal status of CBOs was established. This 
amendment was very clear and does not leave any room for ambiguity as to what an NGO 
is and what it is not.  
3.4.1.2 Allocation of accountability  
In reference to the literature review under Chapter 1, specifically the discussion on 
accountability “in relation to the question of who is accountable”, the research identified 
four categories of actors within NGOs who are charged with accountability. They include 
the organisation through organisational accountability, directors through personal 
accountability, all members and staff of the organisation through collective accountability 
and individuals within the NGO through individual responsibility. From the Kenyan 
perspective, the NGO Act has not allocated any responsibilities of accountability on any 
of the parties highlighted above. From the Act, one notes that aside from the presumption 
of responsibility being placed on the boards, the Act does not provide for the mechanism 
of achieving organisational, personal, individual or collective accountability within the 
NGOs.  
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The NGO Act does not specifically indicate who in the organization is responsible for the 
various compliance requirements raised therein. Section 24 for instance, which deals with 
annual returns, provides that every organization shall furnish NGOCB with annual reports. 
However, it does not state whether it is the board members, the chairperson, members of 
the organization, the officials or the executive staff who are responsible for ensuring that 
the returns are filed. The failure to be specific on allocation of responsibility is a major 
gap in the NGO Act.   
The PBO Act echoes the position in the NGO Act. While it provides for accountability in 
the form of annual returns, it lacks specificity with regards to who exactly is expected to 
ensure reporting is done. The PBO Act simply states that every registered PBO shall cause 
to be made and submitted to the authority, an annual report detailing the statement of 
audited accounts, the financial statements and the activities of the organization.170 Who 
this mandate is placed upon is not mentioned. It may be argued that the failure to specify 
which body or person within NGOs is to be held accountable for this reporting obligation 
is consistent with the spirit of self-regulation and that both the PBO Act and the NGO Act 
leaves it up to the NGO’s own internal mechanisms to allocate this responsibility. This 
lack of specificity on the allocation of responsibility is what was alluded to in Chapter 1 
as the problem of many hands which makes it impossible to hold an individual responsible 
for non-accountability. For NGOs that have implemented proper governance systems and 
have boards, it is presumed that the boards shall be responsible for ensuring compliance. 
In comparison to the Companies Act, provisions regarding who is to be held accountable 
are clear in the sense that directors are expected to prepare individual financial statements 
for the company annually.171  The Act goes further to provide for a penalty in the event of 
non-compliance by the directors under Section 635(3) and places this obligation and 
penalties squarely on the directors. Besides this requirement, directors are expected to 
prepare director’s reports for each financial year in relation to the undertakings to which 
the financial statement relates.172 Considering the prowess on accountability for 
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companies in Kenya, which is attributable mainly to the existing legislative and regulatory 
frameworks, there is need to emulate the levels of specificity contained in the Companies 
Act. From the NGO Act point of view, it is important that legislation provides expressly 
on allocation of responsibility of each party that is charged with responsibility for 
avoidance of the problem of many hands. 
3.4.2 Accountability for what? 
3.4.2.1 Disclosure of financial information 
During the period between January 2018 and December 2019, 3028 NGOs received a total 
of Kshs 166 billion as funding from affiliate NGOs, foreign government development 
agencies, international NGOs, foundations, trusts, individual donors and religious 
institutions.173 The figures demonstrate the importance of the proper financial 
accountability by NGOs. Financial disclosures and reporting is one of the most employed 
mechanism of accountability across many organizations and jurisdictions. In Kenya, the 
NGO Act174and its regulations provide that during registration, the applicant must indicate 
its sources of funds. Further to that, each year all registered NGOs are required to file 
annual reports with the NGOCB detailing inter alia, receipts and expenditures. The Act 
further requires that any expenditure exceeding Kshs 1 million be audited by a Kenyan 
audit firm.175 The returns are filed by filling form 14 which requires the NGOs to provide 
information on personnel, finances, governance, organizational structure and programs.176 
This information is then used by the NGOCB  to  ensure that the activities undertaken by 
NGOs are in line with the objectives listed upon registration.  
The PBO Act improves the disclosure and reporting responsibilities. It places fiscal 
transparency responsibilities on the organization by requiring the PBOs to implement in-
house accounting and administrative measures to guarantee openness in its operations and 
appropriate deployment of resources for the achievement of the organisation’s 
                                                          
173 NGO Coordination Board, The Annual NGO Sector report, 2018/2019. 
174 Section 10 (2)(g), NGO Coordination Act, 1990. 
175 Condition 5, Terms and conditions attached to the Registration Certificate and NGO co-ordination 
regulation 24. 
176 NGO Board Annual Report Form 14.  
45 
 
objectives.177 This was not present in the NGO Act. It further requires the organisations 
to maintain books of account and records and prepare financial statements in line with 
accepted standards.178 Such statements have to be accompanied by the independent 
opinion of an auditor and then filed with the PBOA within six months of the close of the 
financial year.179  
The reporting and disclosures provided for in the two Acts are important mechanisms of 
accountability because they make accessible to the regulator, information on NGO 
operations. Other than the regulator, the legal disclosures enable some degree of upwards 
accountability to the donors and persons who have the capacity to access these reports at 
the NGOCB offices at a fee. The government being the chief regulator, has the power to 
enforce this requirement by imposing sanctions in the event of non-compliance. Such 
sanctions may include fines, imprisonment, threats of loss of registrations status or threat 
of loss of financial support.180  
The gap in the law in relation to financial disclosures is that, the requirement provided 
fulfils upward accountability concerns to the government and regulator with no attention 
to other stakeholders including donors, beneficiaries and other NGOs.  Both Acts remain 
silent as to the dissemination of financial reports to all other stakeholders discussed. NGOs 
are supposed to embrace values such as integrity, transparency and accountability in all 
operations in order to ensure that stakeholders are not taken advantage of more so the 
beneficiaries who receive the services of the NGOs. It can be argued that in the in the 
spirit of self-regulation, the government does not make it its business to tell the NGO who 
its stakeholders are and who needs to be informed of its activities, however, the 
stakeholder theory relied upon in this research demonstrates that organisations have an 
obligation to comprehend the interests and the relationships of all the stakeholders and to 
manage them. It is therefore imperative for the law to adopt a holistic accountability 
approach on disclosure of financial information that encompass all levels of accountability 
including upward, downward, internal and horizontal. The law must seek to fulfil the 
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needs of all stakeholders of NGOs through placing an obligation and a clear mechanism 
for dissemination of information to the other stakeholders.  
In relation to enforcement, one can argue that express enforcement mechanisms on the 
provisions of the NGO Act and regulations are lacking and this has resulted in continued 
non-compliance by NGOs on the accountability requirements. For instance, in 2019, the 
NGOCB noted very low compliance levels in the submission of annual reports. Out of the 
expected 8893 active NGOs, only 3,028 NGOs filed their returns for the year.181 Section 
32 of the NGO Regulations sets out the general penalty for offences under the regulations 
as fine and imprisonment, other than that there are no provisions under the regulations or 
the NGO Act that render the failure to account through annual reports an offence to begin 
with.  
The penalty for failing to submit returns within stipulated deadlines by NGOs was set out 
in Legal Notice No. 84 of 2004.182 Deregistration ensues following such non-compliance 
and reinstatement is only possible upon application and payment of the penalty. Kshs 
25,000 along with Kshs 11,000 for issuance of a new certificate and filing fee of Kshs 
2000 to accompany their returns. As an enforcement mechanism this is clearly wanting 
and insufficient in terms of ensuring accountability since in spite of its existence NGOs 
continue to evade fulfilling their duties as the figures above demonstrate. 
Enforcement mechanisms under the PBO Act follow the same pattern. Save for the fines 
and imprisonment terms imposed upon conviction for failure to produce records upon 
issuance of summons,183 the PBO Act does not directly address enforcement procedures 
for  failure to account in the first instance. Section 64 of the PBO Act considers it an 
offence punishable by payment of a fine and imprisonment upon conviction to make any 
material false statements in any document submitted to the PBOA. The lack of specificity 
as to what document is referred to jeopardises the chances of accountability. 
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3.4.3 How to ensure Accountability 
3.4.3.1 Accountability from a self-regulation perspective 
The NGO Act provides for self-regulation through a collective forum of the NGOs 
established under the Act namely the NGO Council.184 The intent of creating the NGO 
council was good as it promoted the NGO’s idea of reducing government control over the 
sector. The NGO Council was to foster self-regulation amongst NGOs.185 However, the 
NGO Council has had challenging times with leadership wrangles and mistrust between 
the NGO Council and NGOCB.186   
Such wrangles have been witnessed in the past leading to multiple suits. In Republic v 
Minister of State for National Heritage & Culture & 2 Others Ex-Parte National 
Council of Non-Governmental Organizations & Another (2009) eKLR, the ex parte 
applicants sought to have the decision by the Minister of State for National Heritage and 
Culture to appoint a new chairperson dismissed. The notice issued by the Minister 
regarding the dismissal led to a chain of suits in attempts to resolve the issue. In this 
particular case, whereas the court dismissed the suit for want of merit, it raised concerns 
regarding the NGO Council’s pre-existing wrangles which was evidenced by a number of 
suits filed in court concerning leadership and involving various parties. Some of these 
include National Council for NGOs  v Kituo Cha Sheria187; National Council of NGOs 
v George Gitau Wainaina188; National Council of NGOS v Simeon Kanani189 and; 
Spears of Hope Others v National Council of NGOs190  to mention but a few.These 
wrangles, the court further noted, occurred in spite of clear guidelines under the NGO 
Code of Conduct on the functions of the Regulatory Committee in relation to 
appointments.191 
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Another demonstration of the NGO Council’s incompetence is in the National Council 
of Non-Governmental Organizations v Orie Rogo Manduli & Another (2009) eKLR. 
The presiding judge in the ruling, took note of the lack of sanity within the governance, 
leadership and general organization of the membership of the NGO council.192 Even 
though the case was dismissed, it was a clear indication of the tensions that lay in the 
operations of the NGO council and its relation to other entities.   
The NGO Act creates a relationship between NGOCB and the NGO Council by providing 
that the NGO Council has an advisory function to the NGOCB in respect of the code of 
conduct and any further statutes that support the regulation of activities of NGOs.193 Based 
on the provisions of section 24 discussed herein, it is notable that first, the power of the 
NGO Council is limited to an advisory role and the NGOCB has the regulatory role. 
Secondly, the code must be approved by the NGOCB and lastly, there is no involvement 
of NGOs in the development of the code of conduct. This therefore means that the role of 
determining the final contents of the code of conduct vests with NGOCB thus raising the 
concern as to whether this is self-regulation or imposition of codes on the NGOs by the 
NGOCB. Ali-Noor argues that the process adopted in developing the codes is crucial 
because it affords NGOs an opportunity to articulate the values that NGOs believe in. 
Further to that, he opines that the process adopted will determine the eventual adoption of 
the code and active participation by members.194 Consequently, the issues raised above in 
relation to the Kenyan context and most importantly, the failure to involve NGOs in the 
process of developing the code is arguably what has led to minimal uptake and non - 
compliance with the code.  
The NGO Act curtails forming of alliances by different NGOs, in line with the freedom 
of association, since it recognizes the NGO Council as the sole forum for NGOs to raise 
issues and policy concerning the sector. Other informal forums or coalitions formed by 
NGOs are not recognized and have no legal standing to advise the NGOCB on any issues. 
This prevents the comprehensive view of all NGOs since not all NGOs are of the same 
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category and neither do they all engage in the same sector and therefore trying to coalesce 
different ideas into one voice of the NGO Council becomes difficult. The NGO Council 
has no set down functions and structure of existence and the implication is that NGOs 
with more influence might engineer mischief or create policies that will favour their 
operations without considering the necessary interests of all NGOs or other stakeholders. 
The PBO Act emphasizes on the freedom of association which encourages PBOs to form 
alliances in the form of self-regulating forums195 amongst themselves on a voluntary 
basis.196 It goes on to establish a federation for PBOs which will act as an umbrella 
organization of all registered PBOs and the self-regulation forums recognized by the 
PBOA. The federation has been given more structure by the law where it establishes 
offices such as board of governors, provides for the federation objectives and empowers 
member PBOs to vote in election members to the board. The self-regulation forums are 
required to put in place a code and standard to ensure compliance by members.197 This is 
a great improvement from the position of the NGO Act which stops at  requiring  the NGO 
Council to develop a code requiring the approval of the NGOCB. 
The PBO Act further provides that PBOs should apply the principles of transparency and 
accountability in their dealings with donors, the government, beneficiaries and other 
stakeholders. It obligates the PBO Authority to undertake training on self-regulation for 
purposes of the capacity building and general strengthening of PBOs.198 It lays down the 
ethical principles and aspirations and key amongst which is for the PBOs to have a culture 
of transparency and accountability especially on matters of financial resources.199 Coupled 
with other provisions, the Act seems to take a more assertive approach in regulating NGOs 
amongst themselves compared to the NGO Act which does not provide for any rules 
governing self-regulation.  
Self-regulation remains a key component of the PBO Act with principles of governance 
having been incorporated therein including separation of powers, accountability, integrity, 
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transparency amongst others. Opportunities have been created for organisations to 
voluntarily be part of the self- regulation forums of any registered PBO. The forums are 
obligated to have a recognition agreement with the PBOA upon proof, to the satisfaction 
of the PBOA, that the forum represents a significant number of PBOs registered by the 
PBOA. The forums are further required to develop and implement a code and standards 
which their members shall be required to comply with.  
Self-regulation as provided for under the PBO Act is susceptible to non-compliance since 
the PBO Act has limited enforcement mechanisms. The Board of the PBOA is obligated 
to institute inquiries to determine compliance by PBOs to the provisions of the PBO 
Act.200 The generality of this provision does not offer much guidance regarding self-
regulation especially since membership to self-regulation forums is voluntary. In the event 
of breach of the provisions of the code and standards of each forum, intervention by the 
board is likely to be futile. There is need for inclusion of detailed enforcement measures 
in the Act.  
3.4.3.2 Accountability from participation perspective 
Participation is the route through which members of the public can contribute in the 
various stages of project planning including budgeting, financial planning, decision 
making and monitoring of project execution. There are different levels of participation, 
the first level is where information regarding a planned project is made available to the 
public through public meetings or negotiations on available project choices. The second 
level of participation comprises of actual community participation in the project related 
activities through labour provision, fundraising or offering of maintenance services. The 
third level is where the members of the public have the capacity to discuss and bargain 
over decisions with NGOs or government agencies and where possible hold the power to 
reject decisions that are not in their best interests. The final level is where the public is 
capable of initiating its own initiatives independent of NGOs and the government.201  
According to the Arnstein’s ladder of participation, there are eight levels of participation 
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and the groups the levels into three broad categories. The bottom-level which is 
categorized as nonparticipation and tokenism is characterised by little to no citizen power 
in the citizen participation process, whereas the higher levels namely degrees of tokenism 
and degree of citizen power and have higher levels of citizen power. Arnestein argues that 
through relocation of power, communities are better placed in terms of realizing their 
community goals.202  
Najam argues that claims by NGOs that participation occurs can only be termed as sham 
rituals and a feel-good exercise.203 This is because very little authority to make decisions 
rests with the communities and project objectives are decided by NGOs long before the 
participation occurs. The sham participation then translates into sham accountability given 
that unlike donors’, communities may not possess the power to impose any form of 
sanctions on the NGOs.   
Participation therefore is a crucial aspect of ensuring accountability. In order to understand 
the needs of different stakeholders and respond to them, organizations have to involve 
them in the discussions leading up to implementation of projects. They also need to engage 
them in activities to foster such implementation and to incorporate the decisions made by 
the stakeholders. Under the theoretical discussion, it was noted that the crucial part in 
relation to accountability is about the process and procedural justice that gives room to 
stakeholders to input in decisions relating to how resources are allocated and who benefits 
from the outcomes of such decisions.204 Stakeholders accept results when they consider 
the process of arriving at such decisions to be fair even in cases where the results 
themselves are unfavourable. 
There is need for legislative action to give force to this aspect of accountability. 
Unfortunately, neither the NGO Act nor the PBO Act contain express provisions in 
relation to the participation in any of the process highlighted above. This not only gives 
NGOs leverage to ignore the needs of other stakeholders focusing more on one 
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stakeholder thus leading to an imbalance in accountability. It is also contrary to the 
provisions of the constitution on national values under Article 10205 which stipulate that 
participation among the other national values and principles is binding on all state organs, 
state officers and all persons. This applies in the application or interpretation of the 
constitution; in the enactment, application and interpretation of any law or; in the making 
or implementation of public policy decisions. Failure to abide by a principle this 
fundamental is likely to render the existing provisions null. In Independent Electoral and 
Boundaries Commission (IEBC) v National Super Alliance (NASA) Kenya & 6 others 
(2017) eKLR, the Court of appeal firmly determined, relying on jurisprudence from the 
Supreme Court, that Article 10 (2) of the Constitution is justiciable and enforceable. This 
therefore means that in the event of violation, a cause of action can be founded on its own 
or along with other constitutional or statutory provisions. This decision demonstrates the 
integral nature of public participation. Therefore laws have to be inclusive of public 
participation clauses and regulatory bodies have to implement the same in executing their 
duties.  
3.4.3.3 Accountability from a social audit perspective 
Social auditing is a process that collects information on the resources of an organization 
and this information is analysed in terms of how resources are used for social objectives 
and shared publicly in a participatory process. The process is usually geared towards 
encouraging community participation in the monitoring of service delivery and 
expenditure, are conducted by the NGOs with due representation of interests of different 
parties including funders and the beneficiaries. Participation by the community would 
involve gaining an understanding of NGOs’ operations, measuring performance against 
indicators, verifying the actual performance and reporting, thus contributing to the 
improvement of NGOs performance. Social audit is therefore an important tool for 
enhancing grassroots participation and monitoring the accountability of spending by 
NGOs. 
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Social auditing presents a number of advantages to NGO operations such as, ensuring 
proper strategic planning and performance monitoring. Several factors may hinder the use 
of social auditing by NGOs including cost implications, requirements and lack of 
convergence on standards by NGOs. This does not however diminish its value as an 
accountability mechanism and it deserves consideration.  
There are a number of social auditing models and models geared towards improving social 
performance that have developed over the years. The ethical accounting statement 
concentrates on dialogues with stakeholder and their perceptions. Similar, to that model 
is the social performance reports which focus on stakeholder perspectives. Lastly, there is 
the social auditing processes model which was developed by the Institute of Social and 
Ethical Accountability (ISEA) in 1999 and revised in 2002. This model combines 
dialogues with the stakeholder together with development of indicators and assessment 
procedures. Despite the differences in the approaches, each of these models includes five 
key elements of the process: stakeholder identification, stakeholder dialogue, use of 
indicators and/or benchmarks, continuous improvement, and public disclosure.206  
In Kenya, both the NGO Act and the PBO Act do not make any provisions around social 
auditing. The self-regulating codes need to consider social audits so as to improve both 
upward and downward accountability through its integrated approach that allows for 
combination of tools and processes. Successful integration into legal and regulatory 
frameworks is dependent on systematic engagement of stakeholders in dialogues on 
matters that concern them. Laws cognizant of social audit are able to achieve an 
integration of strategic planning, organizational values and governance. In efforts to 
introduce social audit, Kenya should be guided by the models discussed above to avoid 
ineffectual provisions.207 
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The Constitution of Kenya forms the basis for existence of NGOs by providing for the 
freedom of association, expression and access to information. Compliance to this in the 
non-profit sector is vital to the realization of good governance. There is also need for 
compliance with international laws which inform the operations of non-profit 
organizations starting with the recognition of the freedom of association and freedom of 
expression as fundamental considerations in regulation of NGOs.   
The NGO specific legal and regulatory framework in Kenya, while progressive, has 
multiple shortcomings with regards to accountability. Having analysed the different 
provisions, it is clear that the NGO Act in particular is not accommodative of vital 
accountability mechanisms such as reporting, self-regulation, social auditing, and 
participation among others as discussed in this Chapter.  
Recent developments have led to the introduction of the PBO Act, which has been lauded 
for incorporation of constitutional provisions. Unfortunately, it fails to tackle the 
challenges relating to accountability in relation to registration. Without express provisions 
on multiplicity of registrations amongst others discussed in this chapter, a continuum of 
the drawbacks that befell the NGO Act are likely to arise. There is need therefore to 
streamline the provisions on accountability and include proper definition of PBOs, provide 
for enforcement measures and provide for the shortcomings identified herein in order to 
ensure that the Kenyan legal and regulatory frameworks on NGOs is sustainable. Due 
consideration should be given to the questions of “who? to whom? for what? and how?” 
in order to ensure that any proposed measures are responsive to this for better 
accountability in the NGO sector. Transparency between government and NGOs is vital 




COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 
REGULATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
The chapter will first discuss the historical background of accountability in South Africa 
before delving into the specific legal and regulatory provisions relating to NGOs in the 
country. An analysis of the application of accountability mechanisms shall follow before 
a discussion on self-regulation as a means of achieving accountability and how the same 
has been applied in South Africa. In conclusion, this chapter shall summarize the 
similarities and differences between the two countries and whether there are concepts that 
Kenya can borrow from South Africa to improve on its accountability practices. 
Over the past few decades and following its independence, South Africa has experienced 
marked growth in different sectors and particularly in the political and social realms. This 
is attributed to, among other reasons, the input from the NGO sector which over the years 
has seen rapid growth. According to the Department of Social Development of South 
Africa, the number of NGOs increased by 573% from 13, 282 in the year 2000 to 76,175 
in 2011.208  In spite of the impressive figures, the sector has been faced with multiple 
challenges which are tied to accountability. These figures present a great foundation for 
analysing and comparing the status of NGO regulations in the two countries since they 
not only depict positive progress but also indicate flaws in the system. 
4.1 HISTORY OF NGO ACCOUNTABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Historical foundations play an important role in the shaping of a country’s legal structures.  
Apartheid shaped most of South Africa’s existing governance structures and in this 
context, the NGO legislative framework. During the apartheid era, Non-Profit 
Organization (NPOs) were formed in two forms; in support of apartheid and anti-
                                                          




apartheid.209 The latter kind received most of their funding from international bodies 
having been denied funding by the apartheid government. Issuance of international 
funding came with accountability conditions.210  
With the introduction of democracy in 1994, came an opportunity for collaboration with 
the government along with funding. This shift also brought along a change in trajectory 
of funding by the international community which focused on government development 
projects instead. Strict accountability requirements led to the rise of donor-centrism with 
less attention to beneficiaries of the programmes211 just as is the case in Kenya. Without 
inclusion of input from beneficiaries and other stakeholders, downward accountability is 
affected and this ripples down to overall good governance of NGOs.212 Similar to the 
Kenyan case, NGO legislation in South Africa, especially pertaining to accountability, 
originated from concerns about the credibility and legitimacy of NGOs.213 Most, if not all 
laws and regulations were enacted to foster upward accountability among other 
governance issues.  
In South Africa, government efforts at involvement are normally impeded by the 
inadequacy of resources for monitoring and enforcement once the regulations have been 
enacted.214 On the other hand, the government in some instances uses the veil of ensuring 
accountability to limit NGO operations.215 The challenges encountered draw attention to 
the need for exploration of other viable alternatives. 
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4.2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN NGO LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
In this section, an assessment of the South African laws pertaining to NGOs shall be done 
to establish what the status of regulation is in the country. This will allow for a 
determination of whether or not the provisions cater for accountability in the sector. The 
legal and regulatory systems in South Africa are similar to the Kenyan frameworks in the 
sense that they are often derivatives of constitutional provisions and where they are not, 
they have to be in accordance with the constitution being the supreme law of the land. 
4.2.1 The Constitution of South Africa, 1996 
Section 18 of the South African constitution216 expressly provides for the right to freedom 
of association for all. This freedom however is subject to limitations as stipulated in 
Section 36 on limitation of rights.  
The government has relied on this clause to interfere with NPO operations throughout the 
country without taking into account the constitutional requirement for consideration of the 
nature of the right, the purpose and extent of the limitation and most importantly, 
availability of less restrictive means for achieving its purpose. This is similar to the 
Kenyan situation as discussed in Chapter three on the excessive involvement of 
government in the NGO sector.  
4.2.2 The International Framework 
As a signatory217 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),218 South Africa 
is expected to abide by all its provisions and in this context the proviso under Article 20. 
The said article states that everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association. According to Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR),219 everyone has the right to freedom of association with others and state 
parties are prohibited from applying the law in a prejudicial manner. The International 
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR)220 echoes this provision by 
stating that all peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.   
Freedom of association is further enshrined in the Declaration on Human Rights 
Defenders which stipulates that everyone has the right, both individually and in 
association with others, to meet peacefully; to form, join and participate in non-
governmental organizations, associations and groups and to communicate with non-
governmental and intergovernmental bodies. On the regional front, The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR)221 and the Kampala Declaration222 expressly 
guarantee freedom of association. 
Having ratified these laws South Africa, just like Kenya, is bound to abide by the laws 
based on constitutional provisions on international law. Owing to this, the international 
provisions apply to all spheres of governance including NPO regulation. Unfortunately, 
the South African government has fallen short of meeting its obligations in the NPO sector 
on many occasions. 
4.2.3 Legal and Regulatory Provisions on Registration 
Considering the historical foundations of NGOs as discussed in section 4.1., NPO 
regulation has come a long way in its evolution. South African law allows for existence 
of charitable organizations in various forms as is the case in Kenya. Currently, there are 
five models of registration of NPOs in South Africa as discussed further below. 
4.2.3.1 Common Law 
The first and most common of NPO is Voluntary Associations. Owing to the ease in 
registration and less formalities in operation, most entities opt for this model. Voluntary 
Associations are governed by common law and are based on agreement by at least three 
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people. A written constitution may be put in place to further support the agreement but 
this is left to the discretion of the parties involved. Similar to regular partnerships under 
the Partnership Act, all members have a collective responsibility over the association save 
for circumstances where a management committee of sorts is put in place.223 Voluntary 
Associations may be listed as corporate or unincorporated bodies or as a universitas.224 
4.2.3.2 Trust Property Control Act, 1988 
NPOs can be registered as Non- Profit Trusts (NPTs) which is similar to the trusts 
registered in Kenya under Trustees Act. The registration and management of NPTs is 
governed by the Trust Property Control Act225 which stipulates that registration is to be 
done by a master of the High court. The registration process involves examination of the 
trust deed and is rendered complete upon receipt of letters of authority duly signed and 
sealed by the master.226 A key consideration prior to registration is the philanthropic intent 
of the proposed trust and the Act further provides that any land granted to the trust must 
be used in compliance with this objective. 
4.2.3.3  The Companies Act, 2008 
Non Profit Companies (NPCs) which are also commonly referred to as Section 21 
Companies exist and operate as NPOs. The establishment of NPCs is guided by the 
provisions of the Companies Act, 2008 and particularly Section 21 which outlines specific 
qualifications for registration under the Act. A company whose mission and vision 
involves public benefit, cultural, social activities or communal interests meets this 
requirement.  
The Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) under the Companies Act 
has specific registration requirements which upon fulfillment, the company is granted a 
certificate of incorporation duly signed and sealed by the Commission. Foreign 
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organizations are also incorporated under the Companies Act227 and have to abide by 
Section 21 provisions.  
4.2.3.4  The Non- Profit Organizations Act, 1997 
The most common form of NPOs are those created under the NPO Act, 1997.228 These 
are registered and controlled by the NPO Directorate established under Section 5 of the 
NPO Act which is also where reports of activities are submitted on an annual basis. 
The NPO Act was enacted to encourage and support NPOs in their contribution to meeting 
the diverse needs of the population. It is also meant to create a conducive environment to 
allow NPOs to flourish. This is achieved by creation of an administrative and regulatory 
framework under which NPOs can conduct their affairs. Another objective of the NPO 
Act which is critical to the discussion in this thesis, is to encourage NPOs to maintain and 
improve adequate standards of governance, transparency and accountability. In 
furtherance of this objective, the NPO Act also exists to ensure members of the public can 
access information concerning registered NPOs. The NPO Act is also meant to promote a 
spirit of co-operation and shared responsibility with government, donors and amongst 
other interested persons in their dealings with NPOs.229 With objectives this clear, NPOs 
registered under this Act are expected to excel in their operations. However, as is the case 
with Kenya there is a challenge both in adequacy and in implementation of existing 
provisions. 
Failure to abide by existing frameworks has contributed to the extension of poor 
transparency and accountability in the sector. According to a SANGONet survey 
conducted in 2006230, 58% of the members of public agreed that the South African NPO 
sector lacked in accountability. This was further echoed in Hans Holmen’s Snakes in 
Paradise”231 wherein he criticized the lack of accountability in the NPO sectors in South 
Africa and in the rest of the continent. 
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4.3 THE WEAKNESSES OF THE NGO SECTOR LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN 
RELATION TO ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS 
4.3.1 Registration 
Registration is not a mandatory prerequisite for NPOs to operate in South Africa. Due to 
this, it is possible that there is a larger number of NPOs in the country than records 
show.232 By 2011, only 69% of the 15, 265 NGOs that made applications for registration 
were accepted. 4,729 of these applications were either rejected of cancelled. In spite of 
registration of NPOs not being compulsory in South Africa, section 4.2.3 of the research 
has demonstrated the multiple forms of registrations. This can be attributed to that fact 
that NPOs that anticipate donor funding are incentivized to register because non 
registration constricts receipt of government funding or subsidies. Corporate donors are 
also reluctant to donate to the organizations not recognized by the Directorate.233 Besides, 
registration creates an opportunity for tax exemptions provided certain requirements are 
met as is the case in Kenya. 
While the existence of multiple forms of registration presents an opportunity for growth 
in the non- profit sector and may be lauded for opening up the non-profit sector to a wider 
portion of the public, a decline in donor funding, reduced government subsidies and tax 
exemptions is evident. It also presents the challenge of confusion in terms of what mode 
to register under and on the binding force of the given provisions. The challenge of 
multiplicity as was seen in the Kenyan NGO Regulatory framework as discussed in 
Chapter 3 is also present in the South African context.  
The Government of South Africa through the NPO Act allows for registration of NPOs 
upon submission of requisite documentation. It has gone a step further to ensure ease of 
registration by making online registration possible although this does not benefit NPOs 
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beyond city limits with no access to the directorate.234 This challenge of not having proper 
devolved offices was also seen in the discussion under the Kenyan context.  
In furtherance of the accountability agenda, the act provides that the directorate is 
supposed to maintain records of the registered NPOs and review the accounts and reports 
of activities that are filed with them annually by the organizations.235 The Directorate is 
supposed to oversee that NPOs adherence to the Act, the code of practice that it has 
created, the NPOs own laws and constitution up to the point of dissolution or winding up. 
Unfortunately, the NPO register lacks detailed information on the all the registered 
organizations236 and the availability of the register to the public to foster accountability 
and transparency is pointless. This is because access to NGO documents at the Board is a 
daunting task and this coupled with ignorance amongst citizens, presents a challenge in 
putting to account the NGOs. 
4.3.2 Freedom of association   
Freedom of association for non-profits can be subjected to limitations through placement 
of various barriers. Such barriers include barriers to entry, to operational activity, to 
resources, to communication and contact, to speech and advocacy among others.237 
Through such barriers, the state is able to restrict the activities of NPOs which in most 
cases translates to denial of fundamental freedoms which organizations are entitled to. 
Direct infringement of the freedom of association can be derived from action by 
government through means such as intimidation and harassment, arbitrary arrests and 
detention. Aside from such means, these barriers are manifested in legal and regulatory 
frameworks238 thorough placement of funding restrictions, imposition of complex 
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registration processes, limitation of the scope and nature of activities, maintaining control 
of vital areas of NPO operations. 
An indicator of the limitation of the freedom of association is in the lengthy duration of 
registration of NPOs. For those registered under the NPO Act, the period of review by 
authorities is set to 2 months although more often than not it takes 6 months and beyond. 
Review of NPT applications should take roughly 3 weeks and NPCs roughly 3 months 
although this is never the case in spite of it already being too long a period.239 This was 
also the case in the Kenyan context with registrations taking as long as two years to be 
finalized.  
Impediments to the freedom of association are also evident in the reporting frameworks 
and deregistration procedures. Failure by NPOs to submit annual audited statements and 
a narrative report to the NPO directorate as per the Act may amount to deregistration by 
the directorate. Although this is in fact a reasonable provision, it is prone to misuse by 
state in an effort to intimidate NPOs and especially those engaged in ensuring government 
transparency.240 Chapter three of the research discussed this challenge in Kenya’s context 
as well and notable is that he situation is similar in Kenya.  
Denial of registration of NPOs by relevant authorities is based primarily on non-
compliance by the entity concerned. Questions of infringement of the freedom association 
arise from the lack of reasons for denial and lack of express provisions on appeals and 
other measures to safeguard the interests of the NPO.241 NPTs and NPCs may seek redress 
through the Public Administrative Justice Act of 2000 which would require the Master, 
the Registrar of the Director of NPO’s office to provide reasons for denial to an 
independent court.242 While this offers an opportunity for appeals, it is a long shot and 
provisions of the same in the respective acts governing registration would simplify the 
process thus promoting the freedom of association. 
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4.3.3 Areas of accountability  
The NPO Act not only introduced voluntary registration of NGOs but also provides for 
structural and managerial guidelines for non-profits in South Africa. One of the key 
objectives of the Act is to encourage NPOs to maintain adequate standards of governance, 
transparency and accountability and to improve those standards.243  
Further, the NPO Act provides that every registered non-profit must keep accounting 
records of its income assets and liabilities and draw up financial statements with the 
prescribed information and within the stipulated timelines.244 Section 18 of the NPO Act 
goes further to state that NPOs must provide written narratives of its activities as 
prescribed to the director. Information submitted to the director is subjected to scrutiny to 
determine compliance with relevant provisions. These measures are meant to ensure 
upward accountability of the NPOs to the regulator. Other than this form of accountability, 
the NPO Act does not provide for any other form and does not in any way cater for other 
stakeholders discussed under the theories underpinning this research.   
In NPTs, trustees are not obligated to submit audited financial statements on a regular 
basis and only make submissions upon written requests by the Master for administration 
and disposal of trust property.245 NPCs on the other hand, have an obligation to prepare 
annual audited financial accounts and present them through the directors during the 
Annual General Meeting to the members of the company. Another measure of 
accountability is with regards to taxation.  Public Benefit Organizations which are 
regulated by the South Africa Revenue Service (SARS) are required to submit financial 
statements in support of the organization’s income tax return. 
Failure to comply with the provisions on reporting has consequences that may involve 
cancellation of membership although this is clearly insufficient considering the continued 
breaches. The NPO Directorate’s powers for instance, are limited to cancellation of 
registration as a measure of enforcement and nothing more. While the acts are clear on the 
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need for reporting, there are no provisions on measures to be taken in the event of 
misappropriation of funds or even fraud and such issues are left to criminal law provisions.  
NPOs in South Africa stand to be sued by beneficiaries or the general public should they 
derogate from their stated objectives. This is similar to the Kenyan situation where anyone 
else including the donors or government can sue a NGO if it breaches its mandate. 
4.3.4 Self-regulation mechanisms, codes of conduct and their weaknesses  
With a self-regulation model, entities within the NPO sector will achieve an ease in 
operations all the way from implementation, enforcement, monitoring, reporting and 
accountability. Existing regulatory frameworks are relied on not only by internal parties. 
External parties including donors rely on the accountability achieved by regulations in 
place to determine the potential output. In an effort to ensure compliance therefore, 
organizations tend to seek means to impress regulators and miss out on opportunities to 
build their own capacity. Self-regulation allows for independence since funding is 
delivered directly to the NPOs for equitable distribution.246  
South Africa has the South African NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) that was established in 
1995 and serves as the umbrella body for NGOs in South Africa. Its role is to ensure that 
NGOs have an input into the government policies. The SANGOCO has a code of conduct 
that incorporates a number of aspects including transparency. Under the code, SANGOCO 
commits to develop a mechanism that will permit all its stakeholders to be involved in 
programme planning for programmes directly affecting them as well as providing 
opportunities for the evaluation.247 It further provides for updating and implementing 
programmes with stakeholder and community input. Notable is that the membership to 
SANGOCO is voluntary and this progressive provision can only apply to NGOs that have 
registered with SANGOCO.  
The existence of the voluntary code notwithstanding, NPOs are still lacking in terms of 
participation and involvement of beneficiaries and other stakeholders at various levels of 
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operations. Beyond donor-centric efforts and legal abidance, NPOs do not make an effort 
to include the views of other stakeholders whose roles are vital as recognized under the 
code. This is similar to the Kenyan structure considering that on many occasions the 
NGOCB and the NGO Council have in exercise of their mandate failed to incorporate 
participation as a key principle for NGOs. A recommendation for the states would be to 
improve public participation and access to information in light of the existing gaps.248 By 
implementing self-regulation more room is given for much needed partnerships between 
government and non-profit entities.249 
Other than the SANGOCO code of ethics, in 2012, the Independent Code of Good 
Governance for NPOs250 was formed by a collective of NPOs to enhance self-regulation 
and offer guidance for NPOs in their operations with due consideration of the diversity, 
capacity, resources and purpose. The code contains guidelines for good governance and 
standards of performance251 and provides for voluntary commitment along with 
compliance undertakings. The code received major support from donors and the NPO 
directorate at its inception. 
Both codes of ethics in South Africa face the same problem of lacking a means of 
enforcement of accountability measures just like the Kenyan NGO Council’s Code of 
conduct.252 Codes in both jurisdictions outline clearly values and principles including 
accountability but the same appear to be ineffectual on a practical basis. 
The Act also establishes an Arbitration Tribunal253 which only has jurisdiction for matters 
that concern the registration status of NPOs by the Directorate. The tribunal checks on 
any arbitrary actions by the directorate and government in general. This is unlike the 
Kenyan case where appeals are left to the Cabinet Secretary in charge of NGO registration. 
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There is clear lack of harmony in South African NPO regulations. This is attributable to 
the multiplicity of regulatory bodies which complicates compliance efforts especially for 
smaller organizations.254 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
The South African NPO framework has a number of similarities as well as distinctive 
features with the Kenyan NGO framework as discussed in parts of this chapter. This is 
attributable to the foundations which derive from British common law as a result of the 
shared colonial history. One of the differences is the provisions of non-registrations of 
voluntary associations in South Africa. The Kenyan context does not have a similar 
position or legislation. Whereas, generally there are arguments that the Kenyan position 
requiring organisations to register in order to be recognized as legal entities is infringing 
on their freedom of association, we note that in South Africa where there is a provision 
for not registering, entities still choose to register due to the benefits that come with 
registration including donor funding and tax exemptions.   
In both countries, NGO operations are conducted on the basis of fostering human rights 
and ensuring development. The activities of NGOs base their existence on fundamental 
freedoms such as the freedom of association. These freedoms give a foundation to the 
operations of NGOs even before accountability is considered as the fundamental freedoms 
determine their establishment. Freedom of association is provided for both in the Kenyan 
and South African Constitutions which also extend the obligation to international laws.  
In both the South African and Kenyan frameworks there is heavy government influence 
which on most occasions results in excessive control. This is because most laws relating 
to NGO and NPO operations in both countries fail to draw a line indicating how far the 
government can go in playing its part. This has often resulted in loss of autonomy on the 
part of NGOs which contributes largely to the lack of accountability. Advancement of 
challenges in implementation of measures such as self-regulation and donor-centrism 
remain constant. 
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Both jurisdictions have multiple modes of registrations for NPOs thus entities are 
governed by different statutes. While this allows for multiple alternatives in registration, 
it has been criticized as part of the challenge in ensuring accountability. This is because 
the multiplicity tends to cause confusion regarding the integral mechanisms of 
accountability i.e. lack of proper responses to the questions Who should be accountable? 
Whom they should be accountable to? What are they accountable for? How should they 
be accountable? Where these questions cannot be answered accordingly, accountability is 
prevented as is the case for Kenya and South Africa. 
Both jurisdictions also place emphasis on financial reporting which is a mechanism for 
upward accountability to the government. The legal frameworks within the countries fail 
to give consideration to other stakeholders on accountability. In addition to that, the 
aspects of meaningful stakeholder participation and social accountability are not factored 
in the legislative or regulatory framework and where it is factored in the codes it is seldom 
practiced by the NGOs.  
In terms of self-regulation, both jurisdictions have failed to implement an effective self-
regulation framework. Both countries have codes of conduct with the South African codes 
being non-binding in nature while the Kenyan one is binding on all registered NGOs. The 
foregoing notwithstanding, the research noted that in both cases the self-regulating 
mechanisms have been ineffective.   
From the comparison of the two countries, it has been revealed that in both, 
notwithstanding the fact that South Africa is arguably an advanced economy compared to 
Kenya, the NGO frameworks are riddled with challenges that hinder the realisation of 
accountability in the sector. The inadequacies in the legal and regulatory frameworks on 
accountability have contributed to the limitations on opportunities for sustainable growth 
in the non-profit sector. Any efforts by Kenya to borrow from South Africa would 
therefore be rendered futile seeing as there is just as much need for amendments in the 
existing laws and regulations to ensure accountability concerns are captured accordingly 





CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
The two hypothesis to the research argued that the increased cases of non-accountability 
by NGOs in Kenya indicates that there are inadequacies in the Kenya’s legal and 
regulatory framework in relation to NGO accountability. In addition to that, reforms in 
the legislative framework to bring about a system of accountability that is inclusive of all 
stakeholders in the NGO sector in Kenya and provides for their active involvement will 
enhance accountability practices by Kenyan NGOs.   
 Having discussed the inadequacies in Chapter 3, this chapter will establish a 
recommended position on the subject of discussion. The recommendations shall be given 
based on the research findings and shall be reflective of the hypotheses above and 
responsive to the research questions raised, in an attempt to resolve the problem as 
identified in the problem statement. This chapter will first consider the necessity of 
effective regulation as revealed throughout the research. 
5.1 OVERVIEW OF THE ESSENCE OF REGULATION ON 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
The growth in the NGO sector calls for establishment of regulatory frameworks to ensure 
proper coordination of activities and accountability. The contribution of NGOs in the 
economy has attracted the interest of government in their operations thus leading to 
enactment of relevant laws and regulations. Existing laws allow for government 
involvement in the operations of NGOs. However, without limitation as to the extent of 
such involvement, more often than not, this would translate into interference by 
government which jeopardizes NGO independence.255 
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In chapter three, there was a clear demonstration of the impediments caused by 
government intervention in NGO operations in Kenya through regulatory bodies and 
legislative provisions. On the other hand, we noted in chapter one that there is an 
undeniable role of government to regulate NGOs in order to guard against misuse of 
resources by NGOs and to safeguard against weakening of state’s legitimacy.256 In light 
of the foregoing, the argument advanced by this research is; the essence of regulation on 
accountability should be to provide a foundation for the NGOs in their implementation of 
accountability practices and to further provide a mechanism for monitoring and measuring 
the level of accountability by NGOs in Kenya. The result would be a good balance 
between NGO autonomy and government intervention through regulatory actions.  
5.2 SUMMARY OF ACCOUNTABILITY CHALLENGES IN EXISTING LAWS 
AND REGULATIONS 
5.2.1 Failure of legal and regulatory provisions to clarify accountability 
mechanisms 
From the theories discussed in chapter two, it is noted that the legal and regulatory 
framework on NGO in Kenya is not guided by the stakeholder theory. The legal and 
regulatory framework fails to consider vital approaches to accountability which include 
upward, downward, horizontal, inward and functional accountability, all of which are 
important in the realization of holistic accountability. This can be seen in the biases 
encouraged by the provisions towards specific stakeholders within the NGO sector. Focus 
has been placed solely on upward accountability which is keen on financial reporting and 
favours those in power such as the government and donors leading to donor centrism and 
government prioritization whilst neglecting other stakeholders. 
In addition, the existing accountability mechanisms are also not guided by the questions 
“who? to whom? for what? and how?”. This is evident in the lack of clarity in legislation 
on all the parties to be held accountable, to who they should account, what they should 
                                                          
256 Kameri-Mbote P, ‘The operational environment and constraints for NGOs in Kenya’. 
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account for and the means through which they should account. The position greatly 
inhibits the law’s ability to offer proper solutions to common issues around accountability.  
While there is constant pressure on NGOs to respond specifically to accountability 
concerns, the legal and regulatory provisions which should be the guiding framework for 
such responses, does not give clarity on the issue of accountability.  
5.2.2 Lack of adequate provisions on self-regulation 
The NGO Act, its regulations and the code of conduct fail to adequately provide for self-
regulation as an accountability mechanism. Aside from establishing the NGO Council and 
enactment of the code of conduct with limited provisions on self-regulation, the NGO Act 
as is, does not prioritize accountability. The PBO Act makes an effort to cater for 
accountability through self-regulation, especially with the establishment of the National 
Federation of Public Benefit Organizations which is meant to oversee self-regulation in 
the sector. Its implementation however, is impeded by the government’s failure to publish 
its commencement date even though there have been court orders to that effect. The 
implication is that unless the PBO Act is implemented, the sector will not derive the 
intended benefits.  
5.2.3 Multiplicity in modes of registration  
The legislative framework provides for multiplicity in modes of registration for charitable 
organizations. Failure of the legislative framework to consolidate entities of similar nature 
under one law has contributed to the emergence of numerous entities with similar models 
of operation. The fact that these entities are registered under different legislative 
frameworks renders the realization of holistic accountability near impossible. 
While the PBO Act holds great promise for NGO accountability, it presents a number of 
shortcomings including the failure to resolve the multiplicity problem. The PBO Act 
defines PBOs and goes ahead to exclude certain entities from its definition but this does 
not stop them from operating within the confines of the interpretations in the PBO Act. 
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5.2.4 Excessive government involvement 
The discussions in chapter three shed light on the inadequacies of the legislative 
framework on NGOs in Kenya with regards to the provisions on accountability. Excessive 
government involvement for one, is one of the main shortcomings and it greatly affects 
NGO autonomy. In addition, The Constitution of Kenya is crucial in the realization of 
accountability as part of the principles of good governance. It also provides for 
fundamental freedoms such as the freedom of association, expression and access to 
information all of which inform accountability of NGOs.  Provisions of the NGO Act and 
its regulations fail to put in place mechanisms to control excessive interference by the 
government, as well as failing to give recognition to these constitutional provisions and 
international provisions relating to NGO accountability.  
5.2.5 Inadequacy in the provisions on enforcement 
The inadequacy in the provisions on enforcement under the NGO Act and the PBO Act 
exposes the provisions to non-compliance. Besides mandating the board to the PBOA to 
institute inquiries to determine compliance, the PBO Act establishes a tribunal to deal with 
disputes regarding compliance. Due to the generality of these provisions, they fail to offer 
a proper guiding framework regarding enforcement of accountability measures contained 
in the PBO Act. Noting that the NGO Act was passed almost 3 decades ago, the provisions 
on dispute resolution do not follow the current system of dispute resolution which is based 
on principles of natural justice that should afford an aggrieved party of comfort of trusting 
the process.  
Having established the challenges facing the achievement of NGO accountability through 





5.3.1 Establishment of a clear accountability framework  
As noted in this research, NGOs have to deal with multiple stakeholders who have 
competing demands. The law therefore must make provisions for an integrated approach 
on how NGOs deal with multiple and competing accountability demands. The law has to 
ensure that issues to do with accountability are clearly laid out. This can be achieved 
through, first, ensuring that, legislation and regulations are cognizant of the vital tenets of 
accountability that is: who is accountable; to whom they are accountable; what they are 
accountable for and; how they should apply accountability practices. The frameworks 
should consider responses to these questions in order to ensure that any proposed measures 
are responsive to them for better accountability in the NGO sector.  
Secondly, it should recognise the different levels of accountability being upward, 
downward, horizontal, functional and internal. For this to happen, the legislative measures 
need to be cognizant of the arguments advanced by stakeholder theory as it informs 
accountability measures. Stakeholder theory speaks to the need for consideration of the 
interests of all stakeholders and helps avert favouritism and advances accountability 
towards all concerned parties. Enactment of laws reflective of this will contribute 
immensely to the achievement of accountability in the NGO Sector.  
5.3.2 Promotion of Self-regulation and Participation  
As discussed above, some degree of external intervention through the regulatory 
initiatives may be necessary to deal with the issue of accountability. However, as seen in 
Chapter three of this research, self-regulation by NGOs offers a better approach to 
accountability as it allows NGOs to deal with issues affecting their sector on their own in 
order to build integrity.  
To promote self-regulation, the study recommends, that the government should expedite 
the process of implementation of the PBO Act as it has improved provisions on self-
regulation compared to the NGO Act. To further enhance self-regulation, the codes of 
conduct to be enacted in line with the PBO Act need to be consistent with the relevant 
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federation’s mandate. Regular trainings by the regulator of new and pre-exiting NGOs 
needs to be done on self-regulation for better understanding of the concept and of related 
aspects such as internal governance.  
Further to that, there is need to enact codes under the code of conduct that ensure inclusion 
and participation of members of the community. Involvement should be both at the 
planning and implementation stage of projects to foster meaningful participation as it 
ensures interests of beneficiaries and other concerned parties are taken into consideration 
and the accountability process is eased.  
5.3.3 Reduction in the modes of registration 
Multiplicity in the forms of registration as has been cited as a major impediment to 
accountability due to the confusion occasioned by the existence of numerous entities 
operating along similar models but registered under different laws. There is need therefore 
to consolidate entities to be governed by a single law. 
Section 2 of the NGO Act for instance, needs to be clear on the definition by stating the 
extent to which the interpretation shall apply. Such clarity in the definitive scope allows 
for clarity and therefore confusion as to what entities are governed is avoided. The same 
should apply to Section 5 of the PBO Act such that the broad approach to definition is 
applied to all entities currently not registered under the PBO Act. The PBO Act should be 
clear on the transitional clauses to include the registration of such entities including, 
NGOs, Trusts and companies limited by guarantee. The implication would be that all 
charitable organisations would be required to register under the PBO Act.  
For the issue of multiplicity to be resolved further, there is also need for collaboration 
amongst the all the relevant regulatory bodies. This will ensure there is a reconciliation of 
the provisions of the legislative instruments providing for each entity starting with the 
definitions and moving on to their roles. With this in place the confusion caused from the 
similarities and more so the overlapping mandates is likely to be resolved. 
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5.3.4 Reduction of Government Intervention  
Reduction in government intervention is required in order to foster autonomy within 
NGOs and promote self-regulation. Therefore, the model of NGO accountability to be 
provided by the law, should ensure that the government and its public agencies shift from 
the existing adversarial approaches to accountability enforcement and lay emphasis on 
cooperation by both the government and the NGOs. The NGOCB as it currently stands 
subject to section 4 is comprised of members who are not only government officials but 
the appointment is also done by the government through the president and the minister. 
Seeing as it governs NGO operations, there is need for more representation of NGOs than 
government officials. There is also need to consider having mandatory meetings between 
stakeholders, NGO officials and members, the NGOCB and the NGO Councils to ensure 
the interests of all parties are accommodated. 
In addition to this, the government should exercise its mandate with due restrictions and 
in compliance with The Constitution of Kenya as well as the international treaties. Where 
government intervention is allowed, there is need for utmost transparency of information 
between the government with its public agencies and NGOs in order to prevent legislation 
from being used as a means to stifle operations. Limitation of government interference 
will also ensure NGO autonomy which contributes immensely to accountability 
responsibility and fosters self-regulation. 
5.3.5 Improvement of enforcement mechanisms   
Amendments in the NGO Act to include proper dispute resolution mechanisms reflective 
of principles of natural justice are necessary. Alternatively, reliance can be placed on the 
PBO Act, upon commencement, considering its progressive inclusions on dispute 
resolution. There is need for revision of the PBO Act before operationalization so as to 
include comprehensive provisions regarding accountability and related areas. Other than 
that, the PBO Act needs to include express guidelines on enforcement measures to be 
taken in the event of infringement of the provisions on accountability as stipulated in the 
Act. Clarity and consistency regarding what is expected is crucial and has to be considered 
in making the amendments. Accountability provisions need to be supported with proper 
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enforcement measures so as to foster sustainability in the legal and regulatory frameworks 
on NGOs. These adjustments will see to it that the challenges of implementation and 
enforcement do not recur thus rendering existing provisions invalid.   
5.4 CONCLUSION 
Application of these recommendations will not only see to the resolution of the challenges 
encountered with regards to accountability in the NGO sector, but will also foster the 
overall success of the sector as a key player in development. The inadequacies identified 
in the legislative and regulatory framework on NGOs in Kenya shall, upon 
implementation of the given recommendations be resolved accordingly. This is because 
the recommendations are instrumental in the provision of a holistic mechanism on 
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